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I. ASSID.lPtIOlfi Al'D FOUIDATIONS 
The l'reatise .2!:. BUPlan Jaturel bears the significant subtitle, 
-Being an AtteApt to introduce the experiRental Method of Reason-
Ing into Moral Subjects." BURe found inspiration for this endeav-
or in the ~arked success realized in physical science by the in-
troduction of newtonian experiRental ~ethod. In contrast, be felt 
philosophy was only deepening its failure by ~etaphysica1 reason-
ings. Therefore he deterftined to approach the central proble~ of 
philosophy, hUlllan nature, with a new ou.tlook. "The only solid 
foundation we can give to this science itself ~he science of Ran) 
Plust be laid on experience and observation. lt2 Moreover, "thot we 
Rust endeavour to render all our principies as universal as possi-
ble • __ 'tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and 
any bypothesis that pretends to discover the ultil'late original 
qualities of hUNan nature, ought at first to be rejected as pre-
'David Haft" A Treatise of BURan Jatare, ed. L. A. Selby-
Bigge (Oxford, 1940). Hereafter the Treatise will be referred 
to by the letter 1_ 
21, p. xx. 
1 
2 
SUPlptuous and chiPlerical ... 3 Thus experience is the ·found.ation" 
of HUPle's philosophical outlook, the first point of departure, the 
last court of appeal. 
True to experiPlental, scientific Plethod, HUPle gives us a sort 
of laboratory test of this principle of experience. "Suppose a 
person, though endowed with the strongest facult tes of reason and 
reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; be would, 
indeed, !~l1ediat~ly observe a continual succession of objects, and 
one event following another; but he would not be able to discover 
anything farther."4 It is tbe ·continual succession of objects" 
on which HUPle founds his philosophy. 
What are the rules which RUPle lays down as governing the use 
to which the Rind puts experience? There seePl to be five P1ajor as-
su~ptions in HUPle's epist~ology: (1) that experience May be ex-
haustively analyzed into eleMents, (2) that every siPlple idea is 
the copy of a siMple iPlpression, (3) that what is distinguisbable 
is separable, (4) the attraction of association, and (5) philoso-
phical cOPlparison of ideas .• 5 If his insistence on experience 
Plakes HUPle's philosophy phenoMenological, and it does, his theory 
3Ibid., p. xxi. 
-
4David Bu~e, -An Enquiry Concerning Hu~an Understanding,· 
HUPle: Theory.2! Knowledge, ed. D. C. Yalden-Thol11son (Edinburgh, 
1951), p. 42. Hereafter the Enspiry will be referred to by the 
letters EU. 
5This list is copied, with one adaption, fro~ Ralph W. 
Church, RUPle's Theory 2!. !!l! Understandinfl (London, 1935), p.218. 
3 
of know_dge Nakes it logically ato~istic. Let us exaftine tbe 
basic tenets of HURe's theory of knowledge. 
First, what are the contents of experienceP."It has been ob-
served,· Rufte says, "that nothing is ever present to tbe ~ind but 
its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, ju~­
ing, loving, hating, and thinking tall under this de8i9natioo."6 
Generically, then, the contents of experience are perceptions. 
And it is the perceptions tbeJ'lselves that are kn.own and not SOl'le-
thing 01S8 through the perceptions. Moreover, all reality, inter-
nal ano external, is a ~tter ryf perception and experience. Nega-
tively, of course, what 1.s not a Platter of perception and eXperi-
ence is not a "atter of knowable reality. 
Perceptions further "resolve tbeftselves into two distinct 
classes, which I shall call IHPRESSIONSand IDEAS. The difference 
between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with 
whicb tbey strike upon the Mind.-7 Both are, then, objects of thE 
Mind. Their difference in tone or liveliness follows their difffl'-
ence in function. lPlpress"ions are roughly the things we feel, the 
prbtitive awarenesses and reactions of Plan. Id.eas are instru1'lents 
of thought. Hu~e assures us there is little difficulty in under-
standing the difference between ideas and iPlpressi.ons,. "Everyone 
of hiAself will readily perceive tbe difference betwixt feeling 
§.!.:., p. 456. 
7Ibid", p. 1. 
-
-and tbinking.- S But HUNe did not recognize this difference by 
~aking ideas and i~pres8ions different in kind. He Merely assign-
ed tbe~ a difference in quality or tone. 
HUl'le goes on tn tell us that ideas are copies of iMpressions. 
However~ to understand bow ideas and i~pressions are related we 
"lust di stinguish between siPlple and cOl'lplex ideas and. il'lpressions. 
For "thot there is in general a ~reat reseMblance between our 
cot"1p1ex iMpressions an1 ideas, yet the rule is not 'Jniversa11y 
true, that they are exact copies of each other."9 But HUMe af-
firflls, -every siPlple idea bas a sil'lple illlpression, lfh ich resembles 
it.- lO Thus perceptions are either il'lpressions or ideas, both of 
which May be siMple or cOMplex; sil'lple ideas are exact copies of 
slaple iPlpressions. Once again it is ~ade clear that reality, 
even l'Iental reality, is lA~ediately dependent on experience, 
radically on the experience of blpressions. 
The last state~ent is tr~e to such an extent that if we doubt 
the validity of any idea (as, for exaMple, HUMC doubts the notion 
of sUbstancell ) we have only to ask ourselves whether such an idea 
-be derived from the iNpressions of sensation or reflection."l2 
BIbid. 
-
'Ibid. , p. 3. 
10ill~· 
11Ibid • , p. 15. 
l2~., p. 16. 
5 
If it is not to be found in either category, the idea is to be re-
jected as of no philosophical use. Thus all our knowledge of re-
ality is traceable to iMpressions. Therefore, HURe's starting 
point, experience, can be further qualified as sense experience. 
This is true not because he says all perceptions are sensations. 
In fact, he includes such spiritual acts as judging and loving in 
the terN perception. But he does not distinguish carefully be-
tween spiritual and sensitive faculties and operations. Thare-
fore, he coufu ses thcf't in pract ice by trea ti ng the\"! Qni vocally and, 
thus, lays hi~self open to the charge of bein~ a sensist. 
BURe I'lakes the furtber point that co~plex ideas can be re-
solved into si"ple ideas. "Where-ever the i~agination perceives a 
difference aPlonQ ideas, i 1. can easily produce a separation ... 13 
Such a power of the Plind is based ultiAately on the nature of iR-
pressions, of which it is said, Mthat there are not any two iPl-
pressions which are perfectly inseparable."14 In this regard llu~e 
Plaintains, ".!h!!.!.!!.2!:!!: ~stinc.t perceptions !!:J! distinct exist-
ences, ~!h!! ~ Mind never perceives any real connexion a~on9 
distinct existences."lS Therefore, experience is a cOMpound of 
Aany integral percepts. Reality is ato"ic, contrary to what vu1-
13Ibid., p. 10. 
l~tIbic1. 
-
15Ibid., p. 636. There is a difference of opinion aRong 
authors--as-to the interpretation of this passage. A literal inter-
pretation has been given, following NorPlan Ke''lp Sl'li th, The Philoso .. 
~ 2! David ~ (London, 1941), p. 558. 
6 
gar consciousness Nigbt at first attest. But let us review brief-1, and catch up the thread of BUNe's thought. 
Thusfar we have considered the cONponents of experience. 
HUNe has argued that perceptions are ulti"ately traceable to sense 
iNpressions which are atoNic. The next logical question is how 
are perceptions conjoined. The general order that exists in ftan's 
passive reception of sense experience obviously is not caused by 
his activity_ The order in Ran's Nental experience is, however, 
the direct result of his own activity. Having. as it were, ex-
aNined the foundations of experience and found tbeM to be atoNic 
sense iApressions, he now addresses hi"self to an exaftination of 
the structure of experience and the relation of i"pressions and 
their copies, ideas. 
Bufte's radical disjointing of experience bas been noted and 
Nay be sURNed up in three principles: (1) experience Nay be ex-
baustively analyzed into 8leftents, (2) every siNple idea is the 
copy of a slNple iNpression, and (3) wbat is distinguishable is 
separable. But obviously 'our Nental experience does not appear 
diSjointed. Rather, both CORNon unstudied understanding and de-
liberate mental inquiry disclose an orderly Narshaling of ideas. 
Hufte prescribes two prinCiples to explain this order: (1) the at-
traction of association, and (2) philosophical cORparison of idea~ 
Neither of these prinCiples iRp1ies an -ablo1ute- quality in-
7 
herent in the id.eas involved, by reason of whicb they are inter-
related. Such would be contrary to BURe's theory of the radical 
isolation of the events of experience. He teaches that in ordi-
nary perception events are "naturally" conjoined by experience, 
and in studied Mental activity ideas are arbitrarily co~pared. 
But each idea is ato~ic and in no way other-related. 
DUNe describes the two states of Rind in question in treating 
of relations. -The word RELJ!IOI is cORRonly used in two senses 
considerably different froN each other. Either for that quality, 
by which two ideas are connected together in the il'1agination, and 
the one naturally introduces the other • • • or for that particu-
lar circul'1stance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two 
ideas in the faney, we "ay think it proper to cONpare thel't.-~6 In 
the forl'ter sense the ideas are said to be naturally related; in 
the latter, philosophically_ 
In the concept of natural relation we note three factors. 
The first we have already·seen, naRely, the radical separability 
of il'tpressions and consequently of 1deas. The second, consonant 
with the first, is the "liberty £! l2! 1l'tagination ~ transpose ~ 
chanse !!! ideas.- 17 As a result of this power we have our notion 
of a winged steed or a golden "ountain. However, freedoft of COft-
position would result in a cORpletely casual arrangeftent of ideas 
161., p. 13. 
l7!1!!!., p. 10. 
8 
(contrary to COAAon experience) without "soAe associating quality, 
by which one idea naturally introduces another."18 The attraction 
of association is the third, and N6St iAportant, eleftent in the 
concept of natural relation. 
"This uniting principle ~ODg ideas is not to be consider'd 
as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded 
froR the iRagination: nor yet are we to conclude, that without it 
the mind cannot join two ideas: for nothing is Nore free than that 
faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force ••• "19 
This gentle force is "a principle of connection between the diffe~ 
ent thoughts or ideas of the Aind. w20 Thus, in spite of the atoAic 
nature of ideas theNselves, and the cORplete freedoR of iMagination 
in uniting ideas, nature points out how ideas are to be related by 
the force of 8ssociation.21 It is said to be nature that points 
because this force "Rust be reso1v'd into original qualities of 
ha~an nature."22 So the association of ideas Night be referred to 
as a sort of natural deterNinisft of the Aind. 




20!g, p. 21. 
21The Aajor types of attraction "froft which this association 
arises, and by which the Rind is after this Ranner convey'd froft 
one idea to another, are three, viz. RESEMBLAICE, CONTIGUITY in 
tiRe and place, and CAUSE and EFFECT" (!t p. 11). 
22!, p. 13 
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"ents in COfllnon with natural relation, naMely, the atonic nature 
of ideas, and the cOfllplete freedoM of ifllagination. Tbe disti.n-
guisbing fIlark of philosophical relation lies in this, that it is 
a relation which, "we extend to nean any particular subject of 
cORparison, without connecting principle. ft23 
Thus, although natural relation has the gentle force of at-
traction (provoked, as we shall see f by experience) to vouch for 
the extrinsic connection of two ideas, philosophical relation has 
no connecting principle, but rests on a coftparison of intrinsic 
qualities of ideas "without connecting principle." Lacking the 
gentle force of association, which ·constitute Is) the connecting 
factor in the perceptual situation."24 philosophical relation is 
able only to co~pare the intrinsic notes of ideas. Such inquiry 
night be fruitful for action and science or not. It's usefulness 
can only be judged. by l'latter-of-fact knowledge. And natural rela-
tion, through the factor of association by the gentle force of 
attraction, assures us of ~atter-of-fact connection. 
The end result of his theory of relation is the preservation 
of RUNe's theory of atol'lic ideas. For, in natural relation, whicb 
founds the operations of co~on understanding, the ideas are not 
intrinsically but extrinsically connected by the gentle force of 
attraction. And, in philosophical relation, which founds deliber-
2 3.!!!.!,g • , p • 14. 
24Cburch, p. 13. 
10 
ate ~ental activity, ideas are co~pared, but not connected. Thus 
ideas re~ain ato~ic even in the orderly progress of experience. 
Moreover, as noted above, knowledge of the gentle force of 
attraction is ultiAately based on experience. BUAe says that 
"knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by 
reasonings ~ priori; but arises entirely froA experience.· 25 Of 
course this experience Aeans the history of the refteAbered past 
and not the intuition of the i~ediate perception had in iMpres-
sions. However, both are rooted in sense experience. Thus, not 
only all our ideas and i~pressions, but their relations to one 
another are dependent on sense experience. 
It should be noted in passing that the ~ental activity of ~n 
!! founded on sense experience, and that the ~ind !!!! have tbe 
power to abstract an event of experience frOA its ·perceptive sit-
uation." But ideas are "ore than washed out i~pressionSt and ab-
straction does not insulate ideas frOM their neighbors. BURets 
sensilA and ato~is~ are half-truths flowing froft bis natura1isft. 
Hen are not naturally deterftined Macbines, or even Riniature plan-
etary systeRs. The "ost unA.chanical fact about Aan is his living 
intellectual response of insigbt into a perceptual situation, his 
ability to see into the. events of sense experience, understand 
the~ and their relation to other events. 26 
25~, p. 26 
26Hufte's attack on the Retaphysical and psychological argu-
Nents for freedoft is already taking shape. For there can be no 
11 
nu~e confuses the real and logical orders. Only such a 
procedure could result in his peoplin~J real! ty with the nU!'lberless 
entities created by the principle: what is distinguishable is sep-
arable. WilliaM JaAes has several co~ents on this point. "The 
'siNple iMpreSSion' of HU!'le, the 'siAple idea' of Locke are ab-
stractions, never realized in experiencew27 "SiMple substantive 
tideas,' sensations and their copies, juxtaposed like dOMinoes in 
a gafte, but really separate, everything else verbal i11usion,--
such is the upshot of tbis view. w28 VIe (HuNel Rakes events rat-
tle against their neighbors as drily as if they were dice in a 
box.-29 "Our reflective !'lind abstracts divers aspects in the 
Auchness, as a Nan by looking through a tube Aay liNit his atten-
tion to one part after another of a landscape. But abstraction 
is not insulation; and it no !'lore breaks reality than the tube 
breaks the landscape.·30 
But we do not intend to give an exbaustive criticisN of HaR~ 
theory of knowledge. Our intention is rather to sketch the out-
freedoM of the will where the intellect can not transcend sense 
and Ratter, and can not know anything of the nature of reality, 
including the personal self. 
27Willia~ JaNes, Psychology, Living Library ed. (Cleveland, 
1948), p. 244. 
28Jbid., p. 161 
29Wil1iaR JaAes, ~ ProbleNs ~ Philosophy (lew York, 
1931), p. 198. 
30Ibid., p. 199. 
12 
lines of his theory in order the better to understand his tbeory 
of will. At this point it can be said that for Hu~e all knowledge 
is "founded" on experience, and that he erred in equivalently de-
nying intellectual insight. 
There is one epistePlological point that should be alluded to 
while we d.i.scuss HUPle's prinCiples of knowledge. HUl'lets naively 
realistic expressions, especially in the Treatise, can lead one to 
believe hiM a subjectivist. He Plakes statePlents like "nothing is 
ever present to the Plind but its perceptions.·3l or "by!!!! I 
Aean nothing but the iMpression!! !!!!.w32 One ~ight think he 
Aeans the will is an i~pression. 10rPlan KePlp Sl'lith warns against 
Plisjudging the case. He says "the ePlploYAent of the terPl 'object' 
as synony"o~s Nith 'iPlpressions' and 'ideas' leads the reader to 
think that BUPIe is adopting a subjectivist point of view even Plore 
extreP.le than that of Berkeley • • • Be has given no warning to 
his readers that later he will ask theft to distinguish between i~ 
press ions as objects of i"'''lodiat8 experience and phYSical bodies 
as objects of belief. n33 'Individual statePlents, therefore, Plust 
be judged in the light of HUPle's whole doctrine, in whicb case we 
Nust affirft the existence of extraNental realities as presented 
in consciousness. 
3l!, p. 456 
32~.f p. 399. 
33S~ith, p. 116. 
13 
This concludes the brief sUMary of HUJlle's episteJ1!ologica1 
principles. We have touched the points requisite for an under-
standing of HURe's doctrine of the will. However, before proceed-
ing to a consideration of will, it is necessary to touch, again 
briefly on sOJl!le of his psycbo1igica1 principles. 
II. TIlE OPERATION OF HIND 
Three areas of cognition are noted in BUNe's theory by Norftan 
Kenp Smith. They are iNmediate awareness, knowledge, and belief. 
·These are, first the ilVlediate awareness through which we appre-
hend all perceptions or ideas ••• secondly, the Rode of aware .. 
ness through which, in reflective thinking, we obtain knowledge 
in the strictest sense of the terJII ••• and tbird1y, the ftode of 
awareness which he entitles be1ief.·34 These areas are iRp1ied in 
the episteftologica1 foundations already exaftined. Ideas and iJl!l-
pressions fall under the heading of ~JI!Iediate awareness, natural 
relations under belief, and philosophical relations under knowledge 
Let us exaftine the three areas. 
A. DEHOllSTRATIVE DOWLEDGE 
The siJl!lp1est area to treat is that of knowledge or deJl!lonstra-
tive thinking, because it is the Rost circu~8cribed in itself, ac-
cording to HUfIle, a nc! the 1"l08t scantily treated by hiM. In intro-
34~ •• p. 356. 
14 
ducing tbe topic of the kinds of knowledge HUAe says the following 
"All the objects of hUl'lan reason or enquiry "8Y naturally be 
d.ivid.ed into two kinds, relations !!!. ideas and t'latters .2! ,fact. 
Of the first kind are the sciences of Ge ofte try , Algebra, and A-
rithJlletic; and in short every affirPl8tion which is either intui-
tively or de~onstratively certain.-35 After giving SOMe exa~p1es 
froJll ~theJllatics DUPle arrives at his conclusion. ·Propositions of 
this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, with-
out dependence on wbat is anywhere existent in the universe."36 
Thus ftathePlatics, the only exaNple given of relations ~ ideas, 
deJllonstrates the operation of strict knowledge. Ideas, unrelated 
and atoJllic, of course, are blended into a coherent systel'l by "fan-
cy· without anyattel'lpt to verify the relationships with Platters 
of fact. Tbe systel'l is rendered consistent by tbe philosophical 
relations: reseMblance, identity, space and tiMe, degrees of qual-
ity, cause and effect, and proportions in quantity and nUl'lber. 37 
HUMe distrusts dePlonstrative knowledge and Metapbysics. Such 
reasoning bas little to contribute to his experil'lental science of 
Plan, and be counsels distrust of reflective thinking. ·'Tis usual 
with Plathe,mticians to pretend, that those ideas, which are their 









not under the conceptIon of fancy, but !'Ilust be cOMprehended by a 
pure and intBllectual view • • • The sarlC runs through Plost parts 
of philosophy • •• 'Tis easy to sec, why philosophers are so 
fond of this notion of so~e spiritual and refintd perception ••• 
But to destroy this artifice, we need but reflect on that princi-
ple so oft' insisted on, !h!! all ~ ide~s ![! copy'd ~ ~ 
iPlpressions.,,38 The prudent philosopher, ther!, returns to the 
great flood of events and there drinks the saving waters of expe-
rience. Experience alone can lead to knowledge of Ratters of 
fact, which regulates not only the endeavors of science but tbe 
act! ve life of fIlan as well. Therefore. while granting the value 
of deMonstrative thinking for PlatheJllatics and recognizing it as 
tbe sphere of philosophical relations, BURe denies tbis shadow 
world of arbitrarily arranged ideas the power of beiog of assis-
tance in the practical world. In everyday life the clarity of iN-
pressions enlightens all useful knowledge. 
B. PRACTICAL REASOJ' 
The second area of awareness, reasoning of ~atters of fact, 
or, as HUMe calls it, Moral reasoning, is based on belief t 'throug h 
which the ~ind has as its objects independently existing, causal~ 
operative pbysica1 bodies and se1ves.- 39 Tbis is the use of rea-
38!ill" p. 72. 
39S~ith, p. 357. 
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son had by Plan in everyd.ay, practical experience and by the scien-
tist in his experiPlents. Thus, -in this theory of belief taken as 
a whole, we have HUNefs account of the different ways in which iPl-
pressions and ideas are so related as to constitute various per-
ceptions of t be fIlind. -40 
We have left behind us the rarified atPlosphere of the Aath-
el'latician and are now breathing the healthy air of cOJllPlon experi-
ence. The first thing to note is that practical reason does not 
enjoy the certitude of defllonstrative knowledge. Rather reason is 
a Platter of probability. Hatter-of-fact relations take on an ap-
pearance of certitude as experience deepens the rut of invariable 
occurrence. This repeated pattern becoPl8s custoPlary, and custOPl 
causes the natural relating of ideas through associati on. Thus w 8 
see that the conclusions of practical reason are probable, and 
are therefore called belief and not strict knowledge. Practical 
reason is, Ploreover, intiRately connected with the natural rela-
tion of cause and effect. The two points, then, to be considered 
are: (1) the probability of belief, and (2) its relation to cause 
and effeot. 
Reasoning on Platters of faot does not render the t ruth or 
certitude of dePlonstrative reasoning.41 As lil'1ited as strict 
knowledge is, it is, nevertheless, certain wi thin these narrow cm-
40Church, p. 193. 
41EU, p. 24. 
-
-17 
fines. But, it Must be noted. "The contrary of every Ratter of 
fact is still possible, because it can never i"ply a contradic-
tion, and is conceivable by the ftind with the sa~e facility and 
distinctness as if ever so conforAable to reality."42 So as far 
as our practical reason is concerned, it is as easily and truly 
said that the sun will not rise tOPlorrowa s the contrary. 
Wbat, then, is responsible for the Pleasure of certitude we 
have that the sun will rise? Our only guarantee in the discovery 
of truth or falsehood in these contrary state~ents is experience. 
BUPle notes, "nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever 
draw any inference concerning real existence and Aatter of 
Thus we see the difference between the judgPlents of dePlonstrative 
thinking. which are always true, and those of belief, which depend 
on experience for th eir truth or falsehood. The notion of 11 e 
regular riSing of the sun can be exaPlined by the Rind frop! every 
angle, but its validity cOPIes not frop! the elaborations of knowl-
edge but frop! the experie~ce of sunrise repeated over and over. 
Our thinker notes a difficulty here. All the past experience 
iAaginable does not guarantee anything about the future. "These 
two propOSitions are far froft being the saPle, ! have found !h!! 
~ !! Object !!! !lwaY8 ~ attended!!!! !!£h !! effect and 
42Ibid. 
-
43Ibid., p. 26. 
44Ibid • 
18 
! !Eresee 1h!1 other ~bjects, wbicb !!!. in appearance, si~i1ar 
will be attended with siftilar effects. w45 Just because it has al-
- - - --_ .... -........ ---..... 
ways been thisway in the past is no reason to say that it will 
always be this way in the future; and just because it has always 
been this way with one object is not to say it will be this way 
with siPlilar Objects. Thus all reasoning based on experience is 
probable. This conclusion drove DUPle to "reasonable" or restra~ 
ed philosophizing, to "Ritigated Skepticisft.-46 
Therefore. since reason depends on experience,Hnd since ex-
perience speaks for the past and not the future, we can never be 
absolutely certain of practical reasoning concerning the future. 
There are varying degrees of certitude. "Fire has always burned 
• • • But there are other causes which bave been found Plore ir· 
regular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge."47 
We are all aware of this variation of probability and take it into 
account in reasoning. WHere, then, it seeRS evident that when we 
transfer the past to the ~uture in order to deterftine the effect 
which will result fro~ the cause, we transfer all the different 
events in the 8a~e proportion as they have appeared in the past 
• • • As a great nUPlber of view do here concur in one even~ they 
fortify and confirN it to the iMagination, (and) beget the senti-
45Ibid" p. 33. 
46Ibid. , p. 40. 
47Ibid., p. 58. 
--------------
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Rent which we call belief.-48 Thus the strongest forA of proba-
bility is belief. It is the link between .a8t and future and b e-
tween thought and fact. It is the foundation of practical reason-
ing. And of course belief is rooted in experience. 
Practical reason proceeds principally by Aeans of the natural 
relation of cause and effect. "All reasonings concerning Aatters 
of fact see~ to be founded on the relation of cause and ~!fect. By 
PleaDS of tbat relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our " 
lItePlory and senses ... 49 For by JIleans of this relat ion we can argue 
to the unseen cause or effect fro~ its seen correlative. Letters 
received froJll France give knowledge of our friend who is there, 
etc. "Had not the presence of an object instantly excited the id~ 
as of those objects cONAonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge 
Nust have been li",ited to the narrow sphere of our ~8JIlory and 
senses; and we should never have been able to adjust Reans to enis, 
or eAp10y our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or 
the avoiding of evil."SO Therefore practical reasoning or belief 
depends al~ost entirely on the relation of cause and effect. 
Tbis area of awareness, called "belief" by NorAan KeRp SRit~ 
could bave any nu~ber of DafteS to describe it: practical reason, 
~oral reaSOD (this na~e is used occasionally by Hu". biNself), 
.. e~., p. 59 
49Ibid., p. 25. 
50Ibid., p. 50 
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causal reasoning. But in every case what is Meant is the experi-
ential, probabl e know1e dge had by everyone. By using the teM'l 
belief, it is not intended to say that all beliefs arc Platter of 
reason. The ex! stance of t.he external world, for exaillple, is be-
lieved, althnugb it can not be proven, according to BUAe. Belief, 
rather, tndicates the dependence of practical reason on the two 
great beliefs, causality an~ the existence of the external world. 
While dealing with practical reason, it would be good to in-
vestigate one of the prifl'lary uses of reason, its function in RO-
rality. This will be a good illustration of the second area of 
awareness, and will help us in treating of the will. How does 
lJul'le relate reason and Morality, both as regards placing P'loral 
acts and judging the Aorality of acts? 
RUPle says cl.early that "reason alone can never be a Aotive 10 
any action of the will.,,51 Abstract reason can not supply Plotives 
for will action, since it has to do only with relating ideas, 
whereas will action is vet'y Much involved in Matters of fact. But 
what about practical reason? HUJIle says it is connected with will 
action only ind.irectly. "'Tis obvious that when we have the pros-
pect of pain or pleasure, we feel a consequent eMotion of aversion 
or propon s i. ty • • • 'Tis also obvious, that this eJllotion rests 
not here, but PIlaking us cast our view on every side, cOPlprehends 
whatever objects are connected with its original by the relation 




of cause and effect. flere then reasoni ng t alees place to discover 
their relation • • • Rut ttis evident in this case, that the i"-
pulse arises not fro~ rea~on, but is only directed by it.052 Thus 
Hurne places the relationship between Plind and will in practical 
and not deMonstrative reason. Moreover, the relation is an ex-
trinsic one. neason does not supply ~otives but only affects will-
ing ind:lrectly b~" presenting the t'Jatter-of-fact rela tions perti-
nent to the case. Passion sup~lies the ~otive.53 
So ~uc~ for reason as actively helping in the production of a 
will act. How about the relationship of reason to the l'1orality of 
an act already produced? TracH ti.onally, the Plorali ty of an act is 
said to be based on its conforPlity with an objective norl'l. This 
relationship is perceived by reason and the jud~ent of confor~ity 
or defor~ity i. delivered by reason. What is Hurte's theory? 
-Reason,· as Norl'1an Kel'lp S~itb says, "enables us to inforR 
ourselves as to the facts; but it does no Plore; it passes no ver-
dict."54 He notes further, "Aoral approval or bla~e arises in the 
l'1ind, not as an act of .knowledge but as a feeling to which we are 
i!'l1'!edi.ately deterAined."S5 He cites the following passage froA 
HUAe. "In these sentiJllents then, not in a discovery of relations 
52Ibid., p. 414. 
53This topic is treatect fully below, p. 29. 
54SI'ti tb, p. 196. 
55Ibid., p. 197. 
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~f any kind, do all Noral deterftinations consist. Before we can 
pretend to for~ any decision of this kind, everything ~ust be 
known and ascertained on the side of the object or action. Noth-
ing reNains but to feel, on our part, SORe senti~ent of blaRe or 
approbation; whence we pronounce the action cri~inal or virtu-
ous."56 The Noral sense delivers ~oral judgAents. 57 
Once again, reason plays a subordinate part to the sensitive 
nature of Aan. As in the placing of acts reason' did not ~ove the 
will but only inforRed it of the circuAstances of a proposed act, 
so in the Aoral judgAent rendered on an act, reason Rerely estab-
lishes the circuRstances of the act. In the fo~er case reason is 
the slave of a violent passion; in the latter, of a calA passion. 
"Reason is and ought only to be the slave of passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey theA."58 
Thus HUJIle t who has already del'toted del'lonstrative reason to 
the status of Merely transposing ideas, now subjects practical 
reason, in one of its priqcipal functions, to the passions. This 
weighty reference to the passions brings us to the third area of 
awareness within the hUNan Rind, hlpressions, under which HUAe 
56David HUl'le, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Hor-
als,· HURe's Horal and Political Philosophy, ed. Henry D. Aiken 
(New York, 1948). p.-z66. Bereafter this Enquiry will be referred 
to by the letters ~. 
57This topic is considered Rore fully below, p. 41. 
58!, p. 415. 
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classifies the passions. 
c. IH}mDIATE AWARENESS 
The third area is, "the i~ftediate awareness through which we 
apprehend all perceptions, whether passions, sense perceptions, or 
i4eas59_-a node of awareness which he accepts as being infallible, 
and as therefore yielding its own type of ~ facto certainty and 
assurance."60 We are pri~ari1y interested in the i~~ediate aware-
ness of iftpressions, that is, passions and sense i~pressions. 
Ideas will be ~entioned only in passing. 61 Also, the treat~ent of 
the extreNe1y iftportant connection between the passions and hUft8D 
activity will be deferred to tile next chapter. The present dis-
cussion will center wholly on the defini H.on of this area of a-
wareness by tabulating its factors. 62 
"All the perceptions of the huftan Rind resolve th~se1ves in-
to two distinct kinds, which I sba11 call IMPRESSIONS and IDI-
AS. • •• Thos. perceptions, which enter with ROSt force and vio-
lence, we ftay naPie iPipression.; and under this nMe I cOPiprebend 
59Id8&1 are understood here as isolated experiences and not 
factors in knowledge or belief. 
60SPlitb, p. 356. 
61Ideal as copies of iPipressions and their relation to one 
anotber by natural association, del'lor18trative reason, and practi-
cal reason have already been treated. 
62Tbis tabulation is illustrative of HUPle', experi~ental 
technique. All these factors can be recognized in the chain of 
huftan experience. 
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all our sensations, passions and eAotions, as they ftake their 
first appearance in the soul ... 63 
lApressions (and ideas) are divided first into siAple and 
co~plex.64 I~pressions are further divided into "those of SENSA-
TION and those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul 
originally, froA unknown causes. The second is derived in a great 
lIIeasure fro", our ideas.,,65 Il'lpressions of sensation JIlay be exe"'-
plified by "beat or cold, thirst or hungar, pleasure or pain of 
SOMe kind or other.,,66 "Original il'lpressions .... without any 
antecedent perception arise in the soul, froN the constitution of 
the body, froN anilllal spirits, or frOft the application of objects 
to the e.xternal organs. tt67 The iPlpressions of reflexion, which 
result froA other sensations or ideas, Nay be exeAplified by "de-
sire and aversion, hope and fear.,,68 The latter are also called 
"passions, deSires, e",otioos ... 69 
"The reflective iApressions Play be divided into two kinds, 




64~.t p. 2. 
65!ill. , p. 7. 
66Ibid. , p. 8. 
67Ibid. t p. 275. 
68 Ibid • , p. 8. 
69Ibid. 
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beauty and defor~ity in action, co~position, and external objects. 
Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, yrief and joy, 
pride and hUMility."70 The cal~ reflective passions are often 
confused, fIu!'le thinks, with reason. We are said to judge, presuPl-
ably by reason, of the Morali~T or beauty of objects. These judg-
!'lents are actually the result of our l'loral and aesthetic senti-
Ments, which are calM passions. RUPle's chapter "Of the causes of 
the violent passions" i.ndicates that calPl and violent refers not 
only to different classes of passions, but to the experience of 
various passions of the saMe kind in different circuMstances. 7l 
The passions are also divided into direct and indirect. "By 
direct passions I und.erstand such as arise iflll"lediately frOM good 
or evil, frOPl pleasure or pain. By indirect such a 5 proceed. fropt 
the saI'le principle, by the conjunction of other qualities •••• 
under the indirect I cOPlprehend, pride, hUl'lili ty, aMbition, van ity, 
love, batred, envy, pity, Plaliee, generosity, with their depend-
ents. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief, 
joy, hope, fear, despair, "and security."72 
The direct, violent i~pressions of reflection, as being pri-
Marily generative of action, are of chief interest in treating the 
will. They are referred to siAply as passions. Any consideration 
70 6 Ibid., p. 27 • 
-
7lIbid •• p. 418. 
-
72Ibid., p. 276. 
-
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of will has been purposely oAitted here, since it is the subject 
of the next chapter. 
This cOPlpletes the treatAent of the three area. of awareness, 
which Plight be called deMonstrative reason (knowledge), practical 
reason (belief), and blpressions--including, especially, the pas-
sions--(i!l1Flediate awareness). 
The first chapter Plight be briefly sUflU'larized as follows. 
Hu~e is consecrated to the experiMental Nethod, and froN the pre-
judice follows his theory of knowledge. Vulgar consciousness is 
the starting point and is conceived as a chain of atoPlic experi-
ences. These experiences are naturally related in everyday life 
by association, although JWlan is able to fIlanipulate ideas by his 
powers of deductive reasoning. However, for deductive reasoning 
to be consonant with reality, it Must rely not on deMonstrative 
Methods but experience. Experience alone inforMs us of the nature 
of reality, and Plust guide all valid reasoning on matters of fact. 
Experience also infor'ls us of the contents of Mind, which a re ide ... 
as and blpressions. The latter include the passions, which are 
the principles of direction and drive in hunan activity_ 
This concludes our brief inspection of flUMe's episteMology 
and psychology of Mind. It hardly seeAS necessary to point out 
the rooting of his psychological principles in his episteMology, 
but the following points Might be noted. The theory of philosoph-
ical relations, which arbitrarily and wi thout intrinsic jl,tStifica-
tion unite atOMic ideas, begets the theory of deMonstrative knowl-
27 
edge, which has no certitude of Matters of fact. The theory of 
natural relations, which unite atoNic ideas extrinsically and l'lere .. 
1y by association, begets the theory of belief, which is only prc:b-
able knowle dge. The th eory of atomic ideas itself beget s the iPl-
Plediate awareness of nutllerous, distinct "passions." And through 
it all HUtlle has been ~arvelously true to his pro~ise of adherence 
to experience--whether by experience be Meant the reMeMbered past 
or irlPlediate awareness. In this respect he can never be accused 
of inconsistency. But the justification of his radical elllpiri-
cisl'l Plust be questioned. Are the eXperblental Methods copied frol'l 
the science of the Material universe justly applied to the study 
of hUMan nature? Are they adequate? Or does hUMan nature trans-
cend the Material universe? It is assUMed by HUPle that the ~ethods 
are adequately applicable, and therefore that Plan is not More than 
the ~aterial universe in which he lives. Specifically, in conclu-
sion to this chapter on RUPle's idea of knowledge, !'lan is the slave 
of experience and is incapable of riSing above experience in his 




I. THE WILL 
Having given so~e attention to Hu~ets approach to philosophy 
and his theory of know"led.ge, we now co~e to the factors directly 
involved in his theory of deterMinis~ of the will. The first fac-
tor is the will itself. How does Hu~ets doctrine of will fit in 
with the rest of his philosophy? Does this doctrine reflect his 
theory of knowledge? What is the willi s re1a.tion to reason? To the 
passions? Let us begin by considering a few of Hu~e's state~ents 
about the will. 
"Of all t~e i~~ediate effects of pain or pleasure, there is 
none ~ore re~arkable than the WILL; and tho' properly speaking, it 
be not COMprehended ~ong the passions, yet as the full understand-
ing of its nature and properties, is necessary to the explanation 
of theM, we shall here Make it the subject of our enqu iry ... l So, 
will is not strictly a passion, but is closely bound up with these 
fonts of energy and direction. 
"I desire it May be observed that by the ~ill, I Mean nothing 
28 
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but th~ internal i~pression we feel and !£! conscious of, ~~ !! 
knowingll give rise 12. any!!!!!. Plotion .2f. .2.!!!. body, 2!. !!!!! percep-
tion of .2!!!. Aind. tt2 This describes the iltlpression of will--it is 
an if'lpression and not an idea--which is one of the CO~Mon percep-
tions of l'lankind. Like all slAple ir'lpressions it is an ato"lic pefl-
ception related naturally by association to oth~r perceptions. 
To which, we ~ight ask. "The will exerts itself, when either the 
good or absence of evil ftay be attained by any action of the ~ind 
or body.n3 The cir.uMstances, then, of the operation of will, 
like the passions theMselves, include good and evil. I say good 
and evil, "or in other words pain and pleasure,"4 because the no-
tions are identified by HUl'1e. Thus the will is associated with, 
or ~ounded on,"5 pleasure and pain or good and evil.6 
What other factors is the will related to? Reason? If so, 
how? 7 "Nothing is l'1ore usual in phi losophy, and even in COf.'1Plon 
life, than to talk of the co~bat of passion and reason • • • In 
order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy t I shall endeav-
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 439. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid., p. 438. 
6There is SOllle controversy as to whether HUflte should be call-
ed a hedonist. However the discussion is not essential to our 
thcl'le. The probleM :i.5 treated at sOPie length by Sl'llth, p. 139. 
7This problePl was already indicated, p. 21. 
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our to prove first, that reason alone can never be a ~otive to any 
action of the will; and second1l, that it can never oppose passion 
in the direction of the wll1."8 HUMe succeeds to his satisfaction 
and Maintains that although reason is connected with willing, the 
relationship is not as usually conceived. But if reason does not 
Plove the wi 11, what <'08S? "Nothing can oppose or retard the !Pl-
pulse of passion, but a contrary iMpulse. n9 So it is passion 
which causes action, while reason according to its nature, ac-
quaints Man with the ~atter-of-fact relations prevailing in the 
situation.10 "In general, we observe, that both these principles 
operate on the will."ll Such operation is not confused or in con-
flict since passion is a real existent whereas reason deals in 
representations. Being of different orders, reason and passion 
can not be in conflict. 
Thus the factors associated with willing are pleasure and 
pain, reason, and passion. But how are these factors interrelatEd? 
How does the psychological act of willing take place? 
The first F'lovet'lent in the chaIn of events that leads to hURM 
action is in the passions. The passions, Norman KaRp SPlith tells 
us, "deterAine the ends of conduct, and •• " in deterPlining theft 
8Ibid. ; p. 413. 
9Ibid. t p. 415. 
lOIbid. , p. 416. 
llIbid., p. 418. 
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supply also the en.rgies required for their pursuit. They are its 
(the will'~ incentives, and decide us in the 'election' to this 
or that action. H12 HUPIe tells us negatively of the power and pur-
posiveness of the passions. "'Tis certain, that no affection of 
the hUMan Mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper direction 
to counter-balance the love of gain." 13 'rhus the passions are 
appetites, tendencies to certain goods. 
Moreover, "in the production and conduct of the passions, 
there is a certain regular Pl8chanisM, which is susceptible of as 
acellrate a disquisi tion, as the laws of Motion, optics, hydrostat-
ics, or any part of natural philosopby.,,14 'I'bis statement is in-
stru1'lental in our characterization of RUPle's theory of hUPlan nat .... 
as "Natural J)eterroinis'PI." 
!et us briefly look into this ~echanics of the passions in 
their connection with will action. As enuAerated above, the di-
rect and indirect, and caIN and violent passions are 1'10st in ques-
tion in the matter of hUl'lan conduct, that is, desire and aversion, 
joy and grief, pride and hUl'lility, love and hatred. Let us see 
how a volition coftes about. 
DUffie observes that "in order to produce an affection of any 
125Mi th, p. 159. 
131. p. 492. Italics added. 
14David HUf\1e, EssaY!I, ~oralf Political, ~ Literary, eds. 
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, II (London, lR89), 166. 
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kind, 'tis only requisite to present SOMe good or evil."lS This 
presentation is necessary unless we are dealing with one of those 
direct passions l'lhich arises froM natural iMpulse or instinct. 
"Of this kind is the desire of punish~ent to our eneMies, and of 
happiness to our friends; hungar, lust, and a few other bodily ap-
peti tes. 1'hese passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, 
and proceed not fro~ theft, like the other affections."l6 
Supposing, then, that e1 ther a natural iJtlpulse has arisen or 
a good has been presented, what follows? "'T1.s obvious, that when 
we have the prospect of pain or pleasure froFl any object, we feel 
a consequent ef'lotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to 
avoid or ePlbrace what will give us tbis uneasiness or satisfaction. 
tTis also obvious, that this el'1ot100 rests not here, but Y'laking U8 
cast our view on every Side, cONprehends whatever objects are con-
nected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. 
Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation."17 
Thus at the first solicitation of emotion we are Moved to reason 
about the relationships su.rroanding the desired object. As noted, 
however, reason alone can not produce or prevent a volition. 18 




16Ibid., p. 439. 
17Ibid., p. 414. 




true appraisal of the situation and whether Means adequate to the 
desired and are at hand. But reason's office is rather instruc-
tion than ~otivation. 
Al thou gh reason is reflloved frON direc t influence 011 th e will, 
it wou11 be erroneous to assume that the will is ruled by passion-
ate viol~nce. For the will may be moved by a Call'1 or a violent 
passion. Passions are cal~ or violent either naturally--benevo-
lence, love of life. love of children, etc.--or because of the 
proxL"Iity of the object--"Uhen 1 a1\ ill1P1ediately threaten'd with 
any fJrievous ill, ny fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a 
great height, and produce a sensible eNotion. n19 And it is not 
always the violent passion that rules. In fact, "passions influ-
ence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder 
they occasion in the te~per; but on the contrary • • • when a pas-
sion has once beCOMe a settled principle of action, and is the 
predo~inant inclination of the soul, it co~,only produces no long-
er any sensible ay1tation~~20 Thus, even though the passion that 
rales the will "1ay not be violent, passion is still the Moving 
power of will action. "A~bition, avarice, self-love, vanity, 
friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in 
variolls degrees, and distributed tIlrough society, have been, frOM 
the beginnin~ of the world, and still are, the source of all the 




actions and enterprises which have ever been observed anong Man-
kind. "21 
The passions rule even when there 1s a confl let of passions. 
Bu~e notes that "an opposition of passions cO;¥'lonly causes a new 
~,,"otion in the spirits, and produces more disorder, than the con-
currence of a~y two affections of equal force. This newsAotion 
is easily converted into the predOMinant passion, and increases 
its violence, beyond the pitch it wou'd bave arriv'd at had it met 
with no oPPo8ition."22 Thus the passions, even Ifhen in conflict. 
resolve theMselves into a ~ore or less violent i~pulse "according 
to the general character or present disposition of the person."23 
And reason, as it can not produce passion, can not control passion. 
Nor are there grounds for appeal1n~ to reason as having such con-
trol, for the control is intrinsic to tbe syste", of passions as 
explained. 
To SU1'l up. RUPle's psychology of will includes four factors: 
pleasure and pain, passio~, reason, and will. The pleasure and 
paln Play excite passion or be produced by it. But in either case, 
passion is "founded" on pleasure and pain. Passion can be call'l or 
violent, but all will activity is based on passion and not reason. 
Reason can not cause volition, but instructs a ~an being ~oved by 
21m!, p. 85. 
22T, p. 421. 
-
23Ibid., p. 418 
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passion as to the l~tter-of-fact relations obtaining in the situa-
tion. Lastly, the will ~oves body and ~ind to the attainNent of 
the good in ql.test ion. 24 
At this point we Flay question HUPle on tt,e fundaPien tal nature 
\ 
of the will. Is it a generic appetite? Hu~e bas spoken of a calA 
instinct originally planted in our nature of "the general appetite 
to good, and aversion to evil, considered Plorely as such. n25 He 
also says, "the ~ind by an original instinct tends to unite itself 
with the good, and to avoid evil.,,26 "All .'lon, tt he notes else-
where, "it is allowed, are equally desirous of bappiness. n27 But 
noae of these stateMents is attached to the faculty of wi. 11. 
24The critique of BUAe's theory of will that follows is given 
by JaPles Collins, ! History 2£ Modern European Philosophy (}lilwau .. 
tee, 1954). p. 449; "Despite his extreAe language, Hu~e is Noving 
here toward a Roderat. pOSition that racoonizes the guiding func-
ti.on of practical reason, the distinctlve contribution of the ap-
petitive powers, and the need for the Rutual il'lpenetration of rea-
son and the appetitive powers in hU!'lan conduct. Dut he is hinder-
ed fro~ aChieving a balance &nong these factors, because or his 
denial of free choice, his preoccupation wi th the rationalistic 
view of reason, and his own difficulties about the relation be-
tween reason and experience. Hence be tends to give a watered-
down conception of reason in its J'loral function, coalescing it 
with the relatively Nild and ~oderate passions. The practical re-
duction of reason to the Mild passions corresponds t~ the specula-
tive reduction of reason to iPlagi.nation. In neither case does 
Hume preserve the distInctive role of reason in hUMan experience.-
25!, p. 417. 
26,Iill., p. 438. 
27E~1, p. 227. 
-
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Therefore, although Plan is conceived of as having a general appe-
tite for good, and individual passions seek individual goods. the 
will is not conceived of as an appetite for good. 
The will is a power at the disposal of all the passions. It 
bas co~and over body and ~ind, and as the passions require iMple-
Rentation, the will acts. "The WILL exerts itself, when either 
tbe good or absence of evil Play be attained by any action of tne 
Plind or body."28 HUMe is being faithful to his analysis of all 
reality into perceptions of experience. It is certainly true that 
the will-in-act is experienced as the power of cO!1'l1"land.. The far 
Jl10re subtile notion of will as i.n'tellectual appati ta is t'letaphysi-
cal in tbe extre~e. But such considerations are to be shunned. 
Therefore, although HUl'le says the will effects the PlovePlent to 
goot', it is Plan or an individual passion that is satisfied. 
The truth is that lJul'le has very little to say about the na-
ture of tbe will. And the 1i ttle said can only lead to the COD-
clusion th.at the will .is a power of cOPlPland. ItAn act of volition 
produces Plotion in our l!JI'lbs, or raises a new idea in our il"la~Jina­
t1 on. Th:i.s influence of the will we know by consciousness ."29 
We Must conclude that for RUPle the will is not a generic appetite 
of man but Merely the power of cOPl!'land he exercises over his body 
aDd f1lind. 
28T, p. 439. 
-
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The balis tor this concept of will aad it. adJuncta ia to be 
tound in BUReta at08iatie phenoRenaliSft. Bis experiential ap-
proach to reality ilolates individual appetites into a nuftber of 
ditterent and distinct "paseions." The process of willing i. 
broken up into the before, during, and after of passion, reason, 
and cORRand. Bach pha.e i. erected into an independent e1eftent. 
To each pa •• ion i. a •• igned it. own end and energy. To rea.on is 
assigned tbe power of gra'ping Natter-ot-fact relation.. To will, 
the power of coftftand over bod7 and Rind. To pas.ion, the power of 
caueing the will to act. 
Concerning the pro.le .. of deterftini'A of the will, we can a., 
the following. In hi. theory of knowledge, RaD is liNited by BURe 
to knowledge of individual event.. In hi. theory of will, Ran i. 
1iR1ted to willing individual good.. There i. no such thing ae 
knowing and willing!!! good. The result i. that long before BURe 
has ever addressed the prable .. of freedoft be hal denied the e1e-
.. ente n80eela17 to e.tabl~8h liberty of the will. 
II. BTHICJL HAl 
There are eeveral Rore factors of hURaD activity which are 
prerequisite' to a full understanding of BURe's tr.atftent of free-
doft. They are: (1) virtue and natural ability, (2) good and evil, 
and (3) obligation. In a sen.e BUPle's stand on these t'latters, i. 
logically consequent to his theory of deterftination of the will. 
However he himself treat. theft iadepeadently, and tbey are of in-
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terelt for the light they throw on tbe~ethod he ules in approach-
ing the.e probleml related to the hUNan activity of willing. Also 
the.e "atters are. for BURe, a direct introduction to his consid. 
eration of the lIloral argllPlent tor freedo". 
A. IATURAL ABILITY AJfD fIRTUB 
Two points of interest ari.e in this Ratter: (1) wbat is the 
relationship between natural ability and virtue, and (2) what doe. 
BUlIIe think of the cOJIlpleltu. of natural abilities, tbat is, teJllper-
.. ent. As regards the fir.t, there" DO foundation tor a dis-
tinction between natural ability and virtue, according-to RuJlte. 
AI to the .econd, Rd. i. logically forced to grant, a nd freely 
doe. 10, that an individual's t.JIlpera~ent and its exercise is 
purely the result of fortune. In other words, a ~ant8 character 
is predeterftined br his natural endOWRent. And more noteworthy, 
his every action is predeterJllined in his teJltper. Let us take up 
first the relationship between natural ability and virtue. 
HuJlte notes tbat the dispute about the distinction between tbe 
two is a lIlere quibble. 30 Of prinary interest is bis djsJIlissal of 
a di.tinction based on voluntary and Meritorious acquisition and 
non-voluntary, passive reception of pleasing qualities of charac-
ter. Be put. forth tbree objections to a distinction based on 
free choice. Firs!, Plany so-called floral virtues are quite as in-
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voluntary and necessary as qualities. of judgRent and iRagination. 
Moreover, al Right say the safte, in 80Re degree, of the others 
fPther Virtues] J it being a1P108t iJllpossible for tbe JIlind to cbange 
its character in any considerable article, or cure itself of a 
pa8.ionate or splenetic te~per, wben they are natural to it._31 
Thus neitber virtue nor perversity are JIlatter of choice. Second, 
virtue and vice are so denoJllinated froPl tbe fact that they give 
pleasure or pain, not because tbey are voluntary or involuntary. 
Just as beauty or detorNity are not so called because d any vol-
untary quality, so virtue and vice depend rather on pleasure and 
pain. -.ow I believe no one will assert, that a quality can never 
produce pleasure or pain to the person who oonsiders it, unless it 
be perfectly Voluntary in the person who possesses it~_32 Third, 
since tree will has no intlueQce on theacttons of l1len,neither 
bas it influence. on the qualities ofrnen.' ~l'he fabric and consti-
t.:tion of our nin.i no Plore depends on our choice than t bat of our 
body.a33 
In addition to these negative conSiderations, Hufte Nakes SOfte 
positive state~ents about the identification of natural ability 
and virtue, and their opposites. It seeRS evident, in .fact, that 
they are quite the 8a~e thing, for aboth of thePl equally produce 
311, p. 608. 
32Ibid., p. 609. 
-33David HURe. aThe Sceptic,a BUNe'. Moral and Political 




pleasure and have of course an equal tendency to procure the love 
and esteeM of Aanking."34 Likewise their opposites agree. "A 
b1oRish, a fault, a vice, a cri~e--these expressions seeR to de-
note different degrees of censure anl1 disapprobation, which a.re, 
however. all of theM, at the bottOR, pretty nearly all the SaMe 
kind of species. R35 
Since, then, a Man's character is not a Matter of choice, it 
J1lust be entirely predeterMined by nature. "Whoever consi.ders 
wi thout prejudice the course of hUMan actions will firid that Man-
kind are a1P105t f.m"i~ely guided by constituUon and teMper_"36 If 
a Ran be virtuous, he will act accnr~ngly. And if be be perverse 
·such a one Rust be allowed entirely incurable, nor is there any 
re~edy in phi1osophy."37 
It Rust, of course, be conceded that education helps. and 
that good habits are a powerful Reans of reforAing the Mind. 38 
But ultil'late1y natural tel'lper will win out. "In a word, hUfIlan 
life is !'lore governed by fortune than. by reason. "39 
We conclude that, according to RUPie, hUl'lan qualities are to 
34T, p. 606. 
-
35!,!!, p. 291. 
36HuPie, "The Sceptic," p. 346. 
37Ibid. 
-
38Hul'le's logical right to such a clai~ is hard to see. 
39HUfte, "The Sceptic,· p. 355. 
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be distinguished solely on the grounds of the pleasure or displeas-
ure th ey cause Plen. In thi8!,"espMJ.t, natural abi 1 i ty and virtue 
are too istinguishable. And further, since the notionbof volun-
tary and involuntary have no place in hu~an ethics, so-called free 
acts have no place in the develoPAent of character. Man's teNpera-
Plent, the vehicle of his iApact on society, is not the result of 
reasoned effort, but the gift of fortune. 
Hut-ae seePls to confuse tePlperal'lent (natural endoWPIent) and 
character (developed personality). Without such a distinction it 
seePis blpossible to. explain the cui ti vation and flowering of the 
personality of certain less endowed Plen, or, on the other hand, 
the deterioration of other highly gifted persons. 
B. GOOD A..'fD EnL 
As noted above in the treatftent of reason, Ploral judgNent is 
a l:'1atter of sentiJllent and not of reason.40 .Moral judgPlent is the 
result of the caIN, reflective iPlpression or passion called rlOral 
sentiPient. But at that point we 4id little JIlore than note HUNe's 
teaching in this Natter. Here we wish to go into the Platter Nore 
thoroughly_ 
"In this view. cleanliness is also to be regarded as a vjrt~; 
since it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is a very 
considerable source of love and affection. No one will deny, that 
40This probleJll was indica ted on p. 22. 
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a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are 
nothing but sMaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin 
than the uneasy sensation, which it excites in others, we may in 
this instance, seeMingly so trivial, clearly discover the origin 
of the J'Iloral distinction of fice and virtue in other instances."4l 
Clearly thent Plen judge evil by a certain uneasy sensation in 
the presence of the vicious event. And ·when you pronounce any 
action or character to be vicious, you JlUD nothin9, but that froR 
the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or senti~ent of 
bla~e fro~ the conteMplation of it. a42 
HUl'le holds vJgorously to the view that 1'1orality is a l'latter 
of sentiJ'llent and not of reason. "Mdra1s excite passions, and pro-
duco or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly iMpotent in 
this particular. The rules of J'Iloral!ty, therefore, are not con-
clusions of our reason."43 B. M. Laing points out another of 
HUllle's arguNants aijainst the influence of reason. "The conse-
quences which HW'le draws a,re that l'lora1i ty is not, as Sotlle have 
held, capable of dePlonstration; for all dePlonstrations rest on re-
lations. If Morality were derivative fror'l fact\.lal relations, it 
would involve relations characteristic of external things and ani-
Rate creatures, and would be equally valid for theft. But this is 
411. p. 611. 
42!!!!., p. 469 • 
• 3~., p. 457. 
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not the case; it is 8o~ething peculiarly buman. Having therefore 
rejected reason as the basi. of norality, be Nust find that basis 
elsewhere.,,44 Briefly, since all perceptions are either ideas or 
iApressions, and Aorality is Dot a Aatter of ideas, it Must be an 
iApression. 
"Of what nature are these iftpressions, and after what Aanner 
do they operate upon us? Here we cannot reAain long in suspense, 
but Plust pronounce the impression arising frOM virtue, to be agree-
able, and that proceeding frop! vice to be uneasy.-45 
At tbis point HUAe does not ePlphasize the object of Aoral 
sentiAlnt. In his treatAent of free will, however, he is care-
ful to point out the object. "The constant and universal object 
of batred or anger is a person or creature endow'd with thougbt 
and consciousness.,,46 Thus be teacbes that the adequate object ot 
the Noral sentiAent is a person. 
Thus good and evi 1 are judgAents or s entblent s or Ploral r eac-
tions arising froft the natural sentiAent of the viewer of a given 
hUNan event. Therefore, according to HUPle, good and evil do not 
in any sense inhere in things or events. .!l!!,! you pronounce any 
Action ~ Character to ~ vicious, yOU!!!! nothing ~ !h!! !I!! 
!h! particular Constitution of your Nature yOU!!!! ! Feeling !r 
448. M. Laing, David!!!! (London, 1932), p. 189. 
451. p. 470 
46Ibid ., p. 411 
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SentiPient ~ B1Me troPi .!!!! Contegla tion ~!!. !!£!! Virtue, 
therefore, Play ~ cOPlpar'd !! Sounds, Colours, !!!! ~ Cold, which, 
according ~ Plodern Philosophy, !!! not Qualities !!. Objects ~ 
Perceptioa. !! !h! Hind. w47 
This point brings us to the Natter of obligation. For, al-
thougb reason, grounded in experience and thus being objective and 
Rore or less universal, Plight provide SONe nor" of obligation, s~ 
tiNent, so Pluch a Platter of tePlperaftent and natural endowPient, 
would seeR never to be able to provide an objective and universal 
norN of obligation. How does BUNe provide an objective and uni-
versal Plorality and on what fact does be base the obligation to do 
good and avoid evil? 
c. OBLIGATIO. 
Bu~e affirNs that obligation ia a natter of senti~ent, but 
that it is also universal. Tbe source of obligation is s~pathy 
with the bUNan species and. a consequent desire for events to be 
orderod to the utility and pleasure of the species. What is use-
ful and pleasant for bu~anity ought to be done. It Plust be noted, 
however, that tbis passion of universal SYMpathy ia contained in 
the natural endoWPlent of any indi.vidual of the species, with the 
result that SOfta individuals Ray be naturally endowed with less 
than tbe fullness of this sentiPl8nt. Thus arises the necessity 
47David Bu~e, The Letters of David Hune, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, 
I (Oxford. 19321, 3~ -- - ----
r 
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for external NeaDS to insure the execution of socially useful acts. 
We can distinguish two phases in this argu~ent: (1) obliga-
tion, as arising froN sYApathy with mankind, and (2) sanction, as 
insuring the execution of the dictates of sy~pathy. These phases 
Right be called ~oral obligation and physical obligation. 
NorRan KeRp SNith observes that "there is, on HUNe's theory 
of Norals, DO such thing as Noral obligation, in the strict sense 
of the terN. There is, that is to say, no intrinsically self-jus-
tifying good that with authority can claiA approval. The ultiAate 
verdict rests in the ~ facto constitution of the individual. As 
he is a ~eftber of the species, the ~uNaD species, we can count on 
certain uniforNities of preference; but all individuals have in 
SOfte degree their own special preferences, and. these (so long aa 
they continue uncbanged) are aa final for the individual aa the 
aore widely prevailing preferences ~ re for the species qua speciea. 
The only available aanctions are external; they are due to the 
control exercised by the species over the individua1."48 
Obligation is aaid to rest on 87Npathy or bUAanity.49 Hu~an-
ity is said to be a universal sentiAent with which nature endows 
each and every AeMber of the huftan race. "One ~an'8 anbition is 
48Saith, p. 201. 
49Uu1'le's use of the tarA "hul'lanity" Is al'lbiguous. At til'les 
he "eans the species of ~en. At other t~es he Pleans ay"pathy, 
benevolence, philanthropy, etc. In IOl'le arguAents, as below, he 
1'lakes an easy transit froA the abstract idea to the sentiAent. 
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not another's, nor will the saPIe event or object satisfy both; but 
the hUJllanity of one Mil is the hUl'lani ty of everyone, and the saPle 
object touches this passion in all human creatures.-50 Frank C. 
Sharp cO~Jllents on BUlllets teaching. "In the Enquiry he affirNs 
that regard for others ("buManity") is either universal in the 
race or is universal in all those who have not destroyed it by a 
career of criPle. Ignoring tbe deJllands of ~alevolence and treating, 
as he usually does, JIIorality as a ~atter of the service of others, 
he thence concludes to the existence of a code which is valid 
either for all or for practically all the JIIeJllbers of the race.,,51 
As a result of this passion 1f e hope for otbers what we hope 
for ourselves. "Now we have no such extensive concern for society 
but froP} sYl'pathy; and consequently 'tis that principle, which 
takes us so far out of ourse1ves t as to give uS the s~e p~asure 
or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tend-
ency to our own a dvantage or loss .,,52 Thence flows obligation .. 
B. MOl l,aing cOl'lt'lents.. "In what does the obligation to a ct justly 
consist? There is no natural il'1pulse of justice. The obligation 
is due to the recognition of the utility of society and of rules 
of justice; and this utility produces a peculiar pleasure, which 
50!!, p. 253 .. 
51Frank C. Sharp, "Hume's Ethical Theory and Its Critics," 
Min~t XXX (A~ri1 1921), 156. 
52!, p. 579. 
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!! the sense of the goodness of justice and!!. the obligation to 
act justly_,,53 
The basic font of obligation is the desire for happiness. 
Our personal happiness depends on the satisfaction of our passions 
the passion of hu~anity included. "Whatever contradiction ~ay 
vulgarly be supposed between -the selfish and social sentiMents or 
dispositions, they are really no Nore opposite than selfish and 
aftbitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain.,,54 All pas-
-
sions Must be satisfied in one way or another, and all these are 
-
passions. The ~iser finds gratification in feeding his avarice. 
But unsYARetrical gratification leads not to happiness. "Inward 
peace of l'lind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review 
of our conduct--these are e!rcu~stances very requisite to happi-
ne8s.,,55 Thus satisfaction of the passion of sYfllpathy is as req-
uisite to happiness as satislaction of sell-interested passions. 
And ohligation rests on onets 1esire for happiness. 
B. M. Laing sUl'U'larizes RUPlets teaching as follows. "Morality 
is thus grounded in hUPlan nature, which ever~~here is uniforA. In 
this respect it Is analogous to the ele~ent of necessitl present 
in the idea of causation. The idea of ohligation arises froft, or 
53Laing, p. 199. 
54.!!!, p. 259. 
55~.t p. 261. 
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rather is, that peculiar experience of pleasure or pain. w56 He 
cites the Treatise: "when an action or quality of the Rind pleases 
us after a certain ~anner, we say it is virtuous; and when the 
neglect or non-perforI'1ance of it displeases us after! like Planner 
we say that we lie under an obligation to pcrfor~ 1t."57 
But, whi:lt if one is underendowed with sYJ'llp,:thy and overendow-
ed with self-interest? Wh~.t if one does not want to be happy? 
1\:11at if one does not feel "after a certain 'Planner" about good and 
evil? ~anction forces the nonconforAist to conforM. 
There are various agencies of sanction, for exal1tple, or9an-
ized religion, public opinion, an~ perhaps Most obtious, govern-
Ment. Let uS investigate the last of these. HUMan nature has the 
lafltentable weakness of allowing itself to be Ploved Plore b} the 
here-and-now than by the rePlot., even though the latter is better. 
"This is the reason why i.'1en so otten act in con tradiction to their 
known interest; and in particular why they prefer any trivial ad-
vantage, tha t 1s present, to the t'1a i ntenance of order in soci e-
ty."58 
Now, "as 'tis iMpossible to change or correct anything Aate-
rial in our nature, the ublOst we can do is to change our circum. 
56Laing, p. 192. 
57!, p. 517. 
58~~t p. 535. 
r 
49 
stances.- 59 In the present instance the change if effected by 
Plaking the desire f or order in societv i1'1I'lanent. GovernPlent offi-
cials are appointed, who are induoed to Plake the order of society 
their priPlary interest and also to constrain others to regularity. 
-These persons, then, are not only induced to observe those rules 
in their own conduct, but also to constrain others to a like regu-
larity, and enforce the dictates of equity throe the whole socie-
ty.-60 Thus, eupheftistically, HUlIIe justifies prisons, fines, cap-
ital punishMent, etc. 
In SU1'1Aary, obligation 1s the result of personal desire for 
happiness. The pass ion of SyPIpa thy l'Iust be satisfied along with 
other passions. And should SOMe individual be lacking in sYNpa-
thy, social sanction, the natural outgrowth of Mankind's s~pathy, 
is present to regula te individual acti.vi ty to the pleasure of so-
ciety. 
Throughout HUPle's treatPlent of ethical lIIan runs the notion of 
the natural operation of A~nfs powers. Nature directs a Aan's 
life by rePlote control, as it were, since Nature has endowed hiPl 
with Ploral, aesthetic, and other sentiAents and passions. It is 
by the analysis of tbese natural gifts and their influence that 
HUA8 puts forth his theories of the qualities of character, good 
and evil, and obligation. And it is his constant assuAption that 
59!!M., p. 537. 
60 Ibid • 
-
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reason and effort have no direct influence on the ethical life of 
lIlan, whether he be considered as spectator or agent. By Pioral 
sentiMent and sYMpathy, Nature unerringly supplies whatever intel-
lectual or voluntary effort ~ight seeA necessary. In this respect 
Hu~e ~ only carrying out bis general principles of knowled~e and 
volition. 
NorAan KePlp SNith notes that his ethical position is only as 
strong as his overall position: 
I apt not questioning that it [BUMels etbics} sbares in the 
defects, and therefore in the insecurities, of his fundaPlen-
tal assumptions. Should judgMents genuinely cognitive in 
character have to be recognised as entering into belief--as 
ul tiPJ.ately, by ip!plication, RUPle h lAself adr'li ts is t he case--
the capital positions in his ethiCS, no less than in his gen-
eral philosophy, will at once be endangered. For if, as then 
fo110ws--a further step than HUPle has given any Sign of tak-
ing--judgPlents cognitive in character have siPlilarly to be 
allowed as enter'ng into all judgPlents of ~oral approval and 
disapproval, i.e., if ~oral judg~ents involve judgRents of 
apprehension as well as of appreciation, the whole question 
of the interrelations of fet1ing and reason--so fundat"lental 
in his ethics and fro~ his ethics carried over into his gen-
eral philosophY--Ray have to be very differently viewed. The 
problePJ., too, of Aoral obligation Play then be found to deftand 
a quite different answer fropt any that RUPle has been able to 
give. On these, as on other questions of theory, Hufte's eth-
ics is integral to his general philosophical outlook, and 
stands or falls together with it.6l 
In this chapter we have seen that in Hu~ets theory will is 
-
the power of co~~and. It is Ploved by the passions and is not it-
self an ul tiPlate Plover or appetite. Nor is reason involved di-
rectly in l'loving the will. These eleMents of willing have been 
615fti tb, p. 565. 
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set forth by RUPle according to the place each holds i.n the chain 
of bu~n experience. This procedure is in accord with BUPle's ~s­
tePlology. 
Further, it has been noted that an individual te~peraAent is 
a uni.que endolflllent, casually Jl1&de by nature. In view of HU!'le' 8 
theory of willing, then, an individual is quite incapable of going 
beyond his original endOWRent. 
In this theory of Natural DeterPlinisPl, Plan's natural abili-
ties are not to be distinguished froPl his virtues, since both C8aM 
pleasure in others. Likewtse, vices and faults cause uneas! •• ss. 
This feeling of pleasure or uneasiness is the criterion of good 
and evil. The feelings arise froA Plan's Moral sentiPlent. 
Man is !'lorally obliged as a result of his desire for happi-
ness. Sbould an individual not desire his true happiness--as a 
result of faulty endowAent--society iPlposes good conduct on biA by 
sanction. Thus Plan is physically obliged to perforPl certain ac-
tions either by his nature 'or by the threat or fact of sanction. 
BUAe notes that -there is but one kind of necessity, as there is 
but one kind of cause, and that COI'U'lon distinc t ion betwixt Ploral 
and phYSical necessity is without any foundation in nature. H62 
Hu~e set out to iAitate Newton's science of tte universe, and 
like Newton ended up *ith a deter"ined sy8te~. But in Hurte's sys-
te!'l !!!!1 becMe deterMined. In conclu;ling the treatfllent of HUPle' 8 
62T t p. 171. 
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theory of knowledge, the question was posed whether the basic as-
su~ption that the principles of natural science are applicable to 
~an without RodiCication. Now in concluding the treatAent of 
1'Ian's active life, the sa1'le qu~stion becol'les Plore urgent. P'or in 
persuing his goal, nUl'le has iPlprisoned, first, Plan's intellect, 
and now his will, in the Aaterial eleAent of his nature. Man is 
denied intellectual insight and freedoM of the will. 
CHAPTER III 
"OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY" 
I. OF NECESSITY 
Baving co~pleted the sketch of hu~an knowledge and activity, 
we can now consider in detail the problel'! of freedoN of the will, 
and understand how Hu~e arrived at the position he did. This 
treablent will he presented in two parts: (1) HUPle' s argul'lents fer 
necessity, and (2) his answers to certain objections. 
Hufte presents one Plinor and one Najor arguAent for dete~in-
1sl'l. The Plinor arguPlent be never really set forth forNally. It 
is frop! the nature or the will. The Plajor argul'lent is the fruit 
of his theory of knowledge. and specifically, his theory of cau-
sality. The second he sets forth thoroughly. Both will be con-
sidered here, first the Plinor, tllen the Plajor. 
HuPIe's theory of will bas already been presented. At this 
point it is only necessary to recall the latent deterPiinisl'l in 
that U·eory. HUl'le t s notion of will is radi.cally different froPi 
the traditional notion. His!!!.!! is not an appetite, except in 
the trivial sense that its end is to Plove the body and Mind. It 






Now to predicate freedoR of such a blind faculty is neanlng-
less, for freedoA of the will ~eans that the will can deterMine 
the body or fllind (Man) to do either this or that, or nothing. 
Now, althougb Hu~ets will has the power to Nove Nan, it can not 
deterRine itself to cause Plan to act. It has no capacity for ,dI-
deterRination. It Rerely converts the appetitive iApulses of pas-
sion into bodily or Mental activity. ~f itself, therefore, the 
will can not be free to dete~ine hUPlan conduct. 
HUPle's definition of will as a power of co~and, therefore, 
Rakes it iMpossible to attribute freedoR to the will. Thus his 
analysis of the will is in effect an argUMent for d.eteminisPi. 
HUPlets second arguNent for deterMinisM is set forth in both 
the Treatise and the Enguirl. Both treatRents are identical in 
their handling of this arguAent. It Right be sUMPIarized as fol-
lows. "According to RY definitions necessity Plakes an essential 
part of causation, and consequently liberty, by re~ovin9 necessity, 
rePloves also causes, and is the SaNe thing with chance.- l Thus 
the SaNe necessity which prevails in the conjunction of Aaterial 
events prevail also in psychic events, that is, in Plants vOli-
tions. If this is not the cale, the purest chance reigns in ~n'8 
life. This line of reasoning as Hu~e developes it is not only an 
apology for deterJllinistIt but also a polePlic against the traditional 
Metaphysical arguPlent for liberty, as be interprets it. 
1 I, p. 407. 
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Let us begin our consideration by reviewing BURe's theory of 
causality. It has been shown that according to Hufte the independ-
ent events of experience are associated by natural relation. 2 
bis natural relation of events is not the result of an insepara-
ble connection perceived between the events, but of the experi-
ence of their regular conjunction in the past. The ~ost COMMon 
natural relation, anti tLe one which is the foundation of practical 
reasoning, is caus! .!.!!.!! effect.3 
Hu~e thus describes his t~eory of causality: 
It has been observed alroacty, that in no single instance 
the ultiAate connexion of any object is di.'coverable either 
by our senses or reason, and that we cail never penetrate so 
far into the essence and constitution of bodies, as to per-
ceive tl-at principle on which their ~utual influence is 
founded. It is their constant union alone with which we are 
acquainted; and it is fro~ the constant union that necessity 
ari. ses, when the !'lind is deterldned to pass fropt one object 
to its usual attendant, an1 infer the existence of one frOM 
that of the other. Here then are the two particulars, which 
we are to regard as essential to ~cessity, viz. the constant 
union and 1Le inference of the l'lind, and wherever we discover 
ihese we Must icknowledge a necessity.4 
low, as in judging whether one ~ateri.al event is the neces-
sary cause of another we find two factors, constant union of the) 
'Ij)" 
two and the inference of the l'lind frol'l one to the other, so we 
find this union and inference in psychic events. BU1'l8 continues 
2See p. ,. 
3See p. 19. 
4David RUPle, "An Abstract of A Treatise of H~an Nature," 
HUJlle: !heori 2!.. Knowledge, ed. D. C. Yalden-Thol'lson (Edinburgh, 
1951), p. 2 3. 
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the above quoted passage. "Now nothing is ~ore evident than the 
constant union of particular actions [of the wi 1!1 with particular 
~otives."5 He adds the following. "And as there is often a con-
stant conjunction of the actions of the will with their ~otives, 
so the inference frop! the one to the other is often as certain as 
any reasoning concerning bo~1es."6 
Ru~e goes on to show how will action fulfills the essential 
notes of causality, constant conjunction and Aental inference. He 
gives PlaDy exa1'lples of the conjunction of Plotives and actions. 7 
However, to this regularity one 1'light ohject, and Maintain that 
there are as Many exaPlples of irregularity. HUMe replies by re-
ducing the probleM to an objection against his general principle 
of causality_ There are, he points out, cases of perfectly regu-
lar activity. And he continues: 
But below this there are Many inferior degrees of probability, 
nol" does one single contrariety of experi.ment entirely de-
stroy all our reasoning. The Mind balances the contrary ex-
peri~ents, and deducting tte inferior froM the superior, pro-
ceeds with that degree of assurance or evidence, which re-
Plains. Even when these contrary experiAents are entirely e-
qual, we reMove not the notion of causes and necessity; but 
supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds frop! the opera-
tion of contrary and conceal'd causes, we conclude that 
chance or indifference lies only in our judgPlent on account 
of our' iMperfect knowledge, not in the things thePlselves, 
which are in every case equally necessary, tho' to appear-
5Ibid. 
-
6Ibid., p. 264. 
6See , for eXaMple, ~, pp. 85-88. 
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Briefly, irregularity lies not in things but in our i~perfect 
knowledge of tbe~. 
Hu~e goes on to show that not only is the constant union of 
~otives and actions to be found in hu~an activity, but that we in-
fer actions fro~ Motives. "The poorest artificer, who labours a-
lone, expects at least the protection of the Magistrate, to insure 
bil'l the enjoy~ent of the frui ts of his labour. He also expects. 
tbat when he carries his goods to PJarket, or offers theN at a rea-
sonable price, he sball find purchasers • •• In proportion as 
AeD extend their dealings, and render their intercourse witlj oth-
ers .fllore cOPlplicated t they alway s cOfllprebend, in their schePles of 
life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, 
froJ'll the proper Aotives, to co-operate witl, their own."9 Thus, in 
hUPlan acti.vi ty as in. I'lsrely P'taterial events we observe that Men 
infer actions frol'l Notives and that there is constant conjunction 
between theA. The conclusion Must be, feels HuPlc, that hUPlan 
actions are deterMined by ·~otives. 
In SUI'lMary, therefore, it can be seen that HUl'le concludes to 
deterl'lination of the will. On the one hand it is absurd to predi-
cate freedo~ of a power of co~and. On the other it is quite 
clear that "otives cause will acts, and that such causality i1'1-
------
81, p. 403. 
9§!l, p. 91. 
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plies necessity. If necessity is denied, so is causality. And if 
the causaljty is denied, Aan's actions are ~erely casual, unpre-
dictable f and the result of 1: e purest chance. 
In evaluating this position it is good to keep in Aind the 
criticisM already l'J.ade of HUMe's concept of the will. lO There it 
is noted that his definition of the will as power of cOPll'land over 
\ 
Plind and body results froM an atoPlistic theory of knowledge. Al-
so, HUMe's theory of causality finds its source in an ato1'1isPl in 
which isolated events need to be related by the I'lind and have no 
known intrinsic relation to one another. HUAS'S atOPlisPi has al-
ready been criticized. ll 
OMcardinal point needs evaluation at this ti1'1e. BUPle has 
equated causality and necessity. "I begin by observing that the 
terMS efficacy, agency, power. force, energl, necessity, connexio! 
and ~ductive quality, are all nearly synoniPlous. ft12 Further, 
"there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of 
cause, and that the co~o~ distinction betwixt Noral and ~lsical 
necessity is without foundation in nature. a13 Thus causality 
Pleans physical necessity. 
Tbis is truly the crucial point in a discussion of freedoA of 
lOSee p. 37. 
llSee p. 11. 
121, p. 157. 
13~., p. 171. 
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the will, since liberty can be Plaintained only if l'loti-ves can 
cause the will to act and yet not necessitate it. That fIlotives do 
cause the will to act, no one would deny. Thus, in a sense, 
BURets elaboration of the conjunction of Plotives and actions and 
the inference of their connection is arguing a point that needs no 
argul'lentation. And that a cause of willing is "necessary" in the 
sense that there 1'lust be a sufficient reason for the new deterPli-
nation of the will is also granted by all. But how do Motives 
cause and yet not predeter1'line the will to one course of action? 
Hul'Je says they do deterrdne it. To refute his position and estab. 
lish a sound one we l'lust indicate HURe's hidden ~etaphysical as-
SUPlption. 
For RUPle, being is a univocal te~t and all being is ~aterial. 
Consenuently, all causes are !"Iaterial and necessi tat ing. Specifi-
cally, ftotives, the acknowledged causes of huftan action, physical-
ly necessitate the will. "Let no one, therefore, put an invidious 
construction on My words, b;v sayin,] SiAply, that I assert tl·e ne-
cessi ty of hUPlan act ons and place th ept on the saMe footing with 
the operations of senseless Platter. But I ascribe to Platter, that 
intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the Most 
rigorous orthodoxy does or l'I.ust allow to belong to the will.,,14 
It is all in onets point of viewl But there is only one kinct of 
causality, one kind of being. 
14 . ~., p. 410. 
r 
60 
This suppositi.on of univoci ty, as indicated before, 1,8 to be 
denied .15 RUPle has ass W1ted an experifllen tal Method. If It would 
seePl, indeed t that Plon begin a t tIl e wrong end of this qu estion 
concerning liberty and necesai ty, when the,Y enter upon it by ex-
alllining the facu 1 ties of the soul, the influence of the under-
stand:i.n~h and the operaH.ons of the will. Let theM first discuss 
a ftore siMple question, naMely, the operations of body and brute 
unintelligent Matter. n16 But as Fr. Rickaby points out, his fIleth-
£1 is transforMed into a Metaphy~ics. "I rOPlark that, though HUPle 
speaks of beginning with Platter, his reasoning not only begins 
with t'tatter but ends ther'·'. He asserts certain facts and lays 
down certain laws about the operations of brute agents, and thence 
proceeds to extend those laws to intelligent agents, as thOllgh 
there were no new facts in the case. nl7 The "Newton of tbe ~loral 
Life" can not be given a logical licen8e to apply his scientific 
NethOO to Man without adaptation to the il'h'laterial nature of lfJan's 
intellect and will. 
In reality, being is analogous. And, Man. although he has a 
~aterial body, has a spiritual intellect and will which are only 
extrinsically:Jependent on Matter. Thus HUl'le's law of causality 
(granting its validity for the sake of argUMent) •• drawn frOM 
15See pp. 27 and 51. 
l6!lli, p. 96. 
17(JoSePh Rickaby, S.J. 1 Free Will and Four English Philoso-
nhArA London. 1906), p. l4u.---- ---- --- ----
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physical nature has at Most only analogous application to Man. 
Thus RUPlets universal equation of' causality and necessity is not 
warranted. 
A further point, based on HUl'le's own principle of the proba-
bility of Matters of fact,18 is l'lude by JaMes Collins. He says, 
"the causal inference concerns Astter of fact. Consequently, on 
HUPle's own principles, the only type of necessity that is involved 
in historical and statistical inferences is a Aoral one. If such 
a Aoral necessity could be transferred froM. the associative habits 
of the spectator to the elections of the agent, it would not elil'l-
lnate the free nature of the cboice. Moral necessity has no More 
than probable weight, and this Erobability is cOl'lpatible with hu-
Irtan freedOPl. n19 Tbus, although HUPle constantly speaks of the ne-
cessi ty that holds between l'1otives and actions, he has a logical 
right only to probability. The latter is consonant with true 
WreedollJ. 
The basic objection, ~owever, is not to inconsistencies, but 
~o the theory of causality itself. "The necessary then is not 
what always has been, but what in the nature of fuings Must be; 
the two ideas are not the sa~e. Necessity is not cnnstant con-
junction, but iAplication.-20 But HUAe's pheno~enalisA will not 
18See p. 16. 
19Col1ins, p. 440. 
20Rickaby, p. 121. 
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give knowledge of natures and i~plication. Therefore, the radical 
source of Hume's deterMinisM of the will is his theory of knowl-
edge. 
II. OF LIBERTY 
After he establisbes the necessity of human activity, Hume 
goes on to show that this is not to sa,' that Man does not enjoy 
the truest liberty. Reproposes four objections thatl'light be 
leveled against his position by those who preach a fatuous and 
nonexistent "liberty of indifference." the first difficulty a-
rises about the very word lil)erty itself. The second concerns the 
~isunderstanding of the feeling of freedoM. The third deals with 
a I'lisrepresentation of the I"!oral order. And the fourth flows from 
our ignorance of God and His connection wi th the world. Now. 
Hul'le 's answers vindicate "true" liberty. l-ioreo ver in answering 
these difficulties he applies his theoretical explanation of Man's 
freedom to practical experience. 
A. TEIDlINO LOGY 
The first difficulty appears to be sil'lply a ~atter of terms. 
owever, such is not the case. In fact, in d.u8cussing terAS HUPle 
su~~arizes his whole position. He points out two ter~inological 
onfusions which he believes exist in the traditlonal handling of 
be problel'll of liberty. (It will be seen that the two are really 
ne and the saPie.) The first is between liberty of spontaneity and 
63 
liberty of indifference. 'the second is between liblJrty as opposed 
to constraint ana liberty as opposed to necessity. Hume affir~s 
liberty of spontaneity and liberty as opposed to constraint. 
"Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of 
spontanei tYt as it is called in the schools, a. nn the liberty of 
!ndiffer'3nce; betwixt that ,.:nich 18 0PP08' d to viol ance, and that 
which means the negation of necessity and causes. The first is 
even the Most COMMon sense of the word; and as 'tis only that 
species of liberty, which it concerns us to preserve, our thoughts 
have been principally turn'd towards it, an'J have aiPlOst univ(:lr-
sally c"lnfounded it with the oH,er. H20 
Liberty of spontaneity is opnosed to force, violence, and 
constraint. When a Man is not forced to perforM an action, or 
constrained frOM its perforMance, that is, when he is not physi-
cally forced or constrained, he has liberty of spontaneity_ This 
is the libertYt HUPle says, which alone needs to be preserved by 
philosophy_ That other, l~berty of indifference, is opposed to 
necessity and causality_ With such liberty a ~an would act with-
out cause altogeth~~r. Clearly, such a concept of 1 iberty is erro-
neous and is Maintained by philosophers because they are confused. 
The S8J1le confusion is not ed by Btu'!e in tll e EnQu iry, where he 
teacbes his usual doctrine of liberty of spontaneity but gives it 
a new verbal twist. His definition of liberty, if taken out of 




context, Might lead one to believe that !:UJIlC teaches a true liber-
ty of exercise. But the context shows that if t he words have 
changed, the doctrine has not. "By liberty, then, we can only 
~ean ! Eower of acting ~ not acting, accord~~g 1£ ~ deter~ina­
~ of the l!.il~; that is, if we choose to reJ1lain at rest we Nay; 
if we cbf'ose to Move we also May. Now this hypothetical liberty 
is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner 
and in cha1n8."21 In the SaAC consideratlon HUIlie adds the follow-
ing. "And if the definition above ~antioned be ad~itted, liberty, 
when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the saMe thing 
with chance, which is universally allowed to have no existence. n22 
On his own interpretation, then, Hul'te holds tha t liberty, no J'Ilat-
ter how he has defined it, is opposed to constrai~t and not to 
necessity. Thus he is free who is not unrter duress, although his 
~otives necessitate his actions. 
BUMe conclu1es that if philosophers would realize tbat the 
denial of necesslty in hUPlan actions and the affirY'tation of liber-
ty of inrtifference are based on a confusion, all the trouble abnut 
freedo~ woulrl pass away. He exhorts philosophers to believe that 
only constraint is opposed to liberty and that when a Plan is not 




22Ibid., p. 99. 
23Ibid., p. 82. 
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This distinction between liberty of spontaneity and liberty 
of indifference is crucial to Hu~e's theory of freedoR. We shall 
therefore study it very closely. 'fhere are four points to be 
noted: (1) the distinction rests on UUJIle's previously presented 
theory of causality, (2) it fails to explain certain hUMan facts, 
(3) it Aisrepresents true liberty of indifference, and (4) true 
liberty of indifference does explain hUfIlan experience. 
(1) HUMe says liberty of spontaneity is opposed to constraint. 
A JIlan not physically forced to act otherwise is free to let his 
own Plotives cause his will act. On the other hand, liberty of in-
difference does not refer at all to constraint, but, on HUMe's in-
terpretation, the will acts without Rotive. Philosophers propose 
such liberty in order to say t hat the wi.11 is not necessitated. 
Now, the underlying assul'Iption of HUPle's distinction is that cause 
and necessity are coextensive. Thus, liberty of indifference, in 
affirJlling that the will is not necessitated, lets the will act 
without cause. And, liberty of spontaneity, although the Plotives 
cause and thus necessitate will acts, affirAs "freedoJll" since the 
will is not constrained. However, as has been noted, the equation 
of cause and necessity is not to be adRitted.24 Nor need we admit 
this distinction between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of in-
difference, since it is l'lerely a restatePlent of the equation of 
cause and necessity. 
24See p. 58. 
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(2) Liberty of spontaneity, despite its nall1e, is neither 
freedoPl nor liberty. It differs in no way froPl the spontane1lUS 
PlovePlent of sense appetite or instinct. It is purely extrinsic 
freedoPl of external PlovePlent and not intrinsic freedoJll of will and 
choice. Thus were SOPleone suddenly to throw an object at a Plan, 
he would ~Plediately react to catch the object or deflect it, un-
less his hands were tied. And a dog runs to bis Plaster, unless he 
is on a leash. Nor should such a cOJllparison seePl out of place. 
DUPle hiPlself notes the psychic siPlilarity between Plen and aniPlals. 
·The saPle care of avoiding prolixity is the reason why I wave the 
exaJ'lination of the will and direct passions, as they appear ill an-
i~ls; since nothing is Plore evident, than that they are of the 
8aMe nature, and excited by the saAe causes as in hUPlan crea-
turesw2S Therefore HUPle's liberty of spontaneity does not account 
for the evident difference between sensible activity in Plen and 
anbtals and hUPlan voluntary actions in which we say they are free. 
FurtherPlore even when l11en are under constraint, the) are hel 
to be free. Thus prisoners of war, even though tortured, are ex-
pected not to betray their country. If they do, they are believe 
to have abused their freedoPl. Thus liberty is not opposed to con-
straint. 
True freedoPl Plust also be intrinsic. Extrinsically Man is 
the subject of necessary laws like any other Material body. As 




the heavy body falls naturally and necessarily, as the aniAal is 
trained by feeding and beating, so ~an in his body is subject to 
gravity, hunger, and pain. But '!'lan in his spirit can choose to 
step off a cliff or not according to his intrinsic Plotivation. 
And only intrinsic freedoPl is true freedopt. The ~ere lack of con~ 
straint (spontaneity), the freeing froN certain external, physical 
laws is not liberty in the true sense of the word. 
We 1'1ust conclude, the n, that HUNe t s notion of liberty of spon-
taneity fails to fulfill the requirements of true freedom. Liber-
ty of spontaneity leaves certain facts unexplained. 
(3) Moreover, RUPle's view of liberty of indifference as 
causeless will action is a Misrepresentation of the theory of the 
free-will school. He aSlUPles that by denying a necessary connec-
tion between Motives and actions, they deny a causal connection. 
This is not the case. Liberty of indifference does not rePlove all 
causes, it Plerel,v denies the efficacy of all causes but the ulti-
Plate final cause of ASn to·Plove Man necessarily. Thus the causal 
influx of Notives is affir~ed, but their power to necessitate the 
will is liMited according to their position in the hierarchy of 
hURan ends. Thus ~an is "indifferent" to all but his last end. 
(4) True liberty of indifference fully explains facts left 
unexplained or contradicted by BURets theory of liberty of sponta-
neity. Man is endowed with intellectual power to cOJllprehend in-
dividual good things, bis own ultiMate good, and the relation be-
tween tbe~. He bas a universal appetite which follows bis intel-
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lect which can perceive the difference between good and!!! good 
and thus he knows that he is necessitated only to the good and is 
free to choose al'long individual goods. The will chooses good 
things as intellectually perceived. 
The will is, then, deterl'lined to its ultil"late end, but its 
freedopt lies in the Plul tiple choice of the Means to this end. The 
will act is truly caused by these Means (lIIotives) but not necessi-
tated by anyone of them, as it reMains free to choose one means 
rather than another. Any of the !'leans Play be chosen to a single 
final end which Noves the efficient cause to act. 
Such a theory of liberty of indifference leaves l'Ian intrinsi-
cally free to choose and act. It is not just a ~atter of freedol'l 
frol'l constraint, or a spontaneous reaction to sti!'luli. Such free-
dol'l explains why a !"lan, even though in prison, still has freedo" 
of the will. Such a systeA also explains why a Plants Plotives 
truly cause his actions and yet do not necessitate thel'l. 
Horeover, various !'leans are open to a l'Ian, no one of which 
forces his will to act, but anyone of which--under the influence 
of the end to which it is directed.-can cause the will to act. 
Thus a Nan is l'Iorally responsible for his actions, according to 
his choices aftODg l'Ieans. softe good and sOl'le evil. And thus ftan, 
and not God, is responsible for the sin in the world, since Ran 
chooses &Rong Nany AeaDS and is not dete~~ined by his created na-
ture to choose certain l'Ieans, sOPle of which !'lay be evil. 
DUPle has sUNMed up his theory in the distinction between lib-
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erty (If spontaneity and liberty of i.ndifference. His presentation 
of indifference as causeless action ~ust be rejected. And his 
presentation of liberty of spontaneity as true liberty Must be re-
jected. True liberty of indifference, on the other hand, pre-
serves the causality of "otives and the intrinsic freedo" of 
choice between Aotives. 
B. THE FEELING OF FREEOOM 
The second objection BUAe raises against hiMself is based on 
what he considers the l'lisrepresentation of the feeling of freedoA. 
It is argued against his theory of deterRination of the will that 
in the act of willing we feel that we are free to follow ftore than 
one course of action and that we choose the preferred course. He 
handles this objection the saMe way in the Treatise and the !!-
quirl,26 as follows: 
Tbe prevalence of the doctrine of liberty Ray be ac-
counted for frol'l anot her cause, viz. a false sensation or 
seePling experience wbich we have, or ~ay have, of liberty of 
indifference in l'lany of our actions. • • • Now we May ob-
serve that, though in reflecting on hu~n actions we seldoM 
feel such a looseness or indifference. but are cOI"lPlonly able 
to infere thel'l with considerable certainty froM their Aotives 
and fro~ the di spositions of the agent. Yet i.t frequently 
happens that, in perf~in9 the actions the~selves, we are 
sensible of sORetaing like it (Liberti]: and as all resePl-
bllng objects are readily taken for each other, this has been 
e~ployed as a det'tonstrative and even intuitive proof of hUl'I8n 
liberty. • • • And it seeMS certain that, however we ~ay iA-
agine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can 
26ft p. 408; EU, p. 97. 
- -
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cOPlJllonly infere our actions frofll our f110tives and character.27 
JaPles Collins COMPlents on this argufIlentation. "He argues 
fro~ a deterPlination in tbe ~pectator's knowledge to a deterNina-
tion of the agent's conduct. tt28 Thus HUfIle JIlisses the point of the 
objection fro~ introspection. In effect be says that sucb inter-
nal data can not be true because it is not in conforPlity with the 
previously explained theory of deterPlination. 
An even Plore basic fallacy is to be found in this present 
line of reasoning. Tbe objection froft introspection is placed a-
gainst the prePlise of deterJllinisPl, and HUPle answers the objeetion 
by reaffirJlling the prePlise1 As. Fr. Rickaby says, -the defects of 
the preJllisses are Plade good by begging what should have been 
proved. ,,29 For here HUPle supposes that our introspection is erro-
neous because our wills, as be feels he bas already proven, can 
not be free. 
HUPle seePlI to perceive the weakness of his position against 
this arguPlent frop! introspt!ction and attel'1pts to disprove the evi-
dence of consciousness. In effect be states that there is no evi-
dance for consciousness of freedoPl because no one can prove it ex-
ists. "We feel that our actions are subject to nothing; because 
when by a denial of it we are provodtd to try, we feel that it 
27 7 EU, p. 9 • 
-
28Collins, p. 440. 
29riCkabYt p. 128. 
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~oves easily every way, and produces an i~age of itself even on 
that side, on which it did not settle. This i~age or faint AO-
tion, we perswade ourselves, could have been co~pleated into the 
thing itself; because, shou'd that be deny·d, we find, upon second 
trial, that it can. .But tbese efforts are all in vain; and what-
ever capricious and irregular actions we ~ay perfor~; we can never 
free ourselves frol"l the bonfls of necessity."30 
HUl'le argues that the only way 'We could prove we are free, as 
our conscience testifies, is to reduplicate the circu1"lstances and 
perforM SOPle other action. But even here there is a I'lotive at 
work, na~ely, the desire to prove ourselves free. Therefore, tbe 
instance only goes to show that we are necessitated. 
Collins wonders, "bow the desire to display a nonexistent 
freedoft can Mysteriously arise in hUAan experience. n31 But the 
deeper point at issue, evidence provided by personal intellectual 
experience, has already been settled by HU1"le. 32 Evidence of an 
intellectual nature, testi~ony of things and ideas wbich goes be-
yond il'lpr essi ons is not to be adMi tt ed. Thus the "faint Plot ion" 
of freedo~ is not an i~pression and any atteMpted proof dependent 
upon it is false. Ru"e's rejection, therefore, of this psycholog-
ical argu~ent for rreedo~ ste~s directly frOM his theory of knowl-
30T, p. 408. 
-
31Co1lins, p. 441. 




edge, and his denial of true intellectual insight into the Aotiva. 
tlon of our own free activities. 
That we have such insight is born out in our striving for 
i ! 
personal happiness. We are well aware that certain Ae~s, per-
haps Aore difficult here and now, will better brinl.1 abJull! our hap-
., I \ 
! ! piness ttan others. Happily we choose the better f'lean;.,or unhap-
1 \ 
pily we ch 00S8 otherwise. But in ei ther case we know 1hal~ the 
Pleans are not tbel'lselves happiness. And we know that \he1'1eans 
are chosen to attain happiness, and that .arious I'leans!are apt to 
I 
the desired goal. And we are also quite conscious in Choosing one 
I 
Pleans to happiness that that ~ans in itself did not n.cessitate 
us to its choice, and that we could, if we so wished, ~~ve chosen 
another Pleans instead. This consiliul'l furnishes an exa~p1e of the 
intelligent insight we have into the Notivation of our activities. 
And consciousness of our choice based on this £pnsi1iul'l is valid 
t88til'lony to our genuine freedol'l. 
The evidence of consciousness presents a difficulty for HW'!e, 
one wbich he can overcol'le, in fact, only by denying that evidence. 
True freedofll of indifference, on the other hand, finds in the con-
sciousness of freedoft a verification. Consciousness testifies to 
a diversity of l'J.eans wbich are conSidered, and one of which is 
freely chosen in order to attain the desired end. 
C. THE MOP.AL ORDER 




arising fro~ the Aoral order. It Night be said that his doctrine 
would endanger ralig i on and fIlorali ty. But he would. "dare venture 
to atfir~, that the doctrine of necessity, according to My expla-
nation of it, is not only innocent, but even advantageous to reli-
gion and ~arality."33 Thus he finds in the ~oral order a proof, 
not tor ~ants freedofll, but for his deterfllina1ion. Liberty, be 
~aintains, is incofllpatible with the ifllputation of responsibility 
and M.th the influence of sanction. Thus only necessity can ex-
plain and save the fIloral order as we know it. The argufIlentation 
is fIlainly positive, but by ifllplication the traditional argufllent 
for freedol'l froA the l'loral order is IPipugned. Let us exaPline 
HUflle's vindication of necessity as essential to the concepts of 
sanction and responsibility. 
After reciting his principles of constant conjunction of fIlO-
tives and actions and the universal inference frofll one to the oth-
er by fIlankind, be states that the necessity thus proven is essen-
tial to all law, hUrlan and divine. "All laws being founded on re-
wards and punish~nts, it is supposed as a funda~ental principle 
that these fIlotives have a regular and uniforPJ. influence on the 
~ind; and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. We 
!'lay give to this influence what nafllc we please; but, as it is usu-
ally conjoined with the action, it Nust be esteeRed a cause, and 
be looked upon as an instance of that necessity which we would 
33 !, p. 409. 
1 
here established. w34 
An unexpressed conclusion of this argu~ent is that liberty 
can not explain sanction. For, were liberty of indifference en-
joyed by Nen, sanctions could not be ~otives, since there would be 
!!2 fIIotive which could cause action. But, as it is an oh,erved 
fact that sanctions do influence hu~an actions, ~en do not have 
liberty of indifference. Thus HUAe finds in his teaching on sanc-
tion an afrir~ation of his deterfllinisfIl and an argUAent against 
liberty of indifference. 
Let us note several points about this argul'lent froA sanction. 
BUAe's allusion to laws as "founded" on sanction indicates his 
positivistic approach to law. Both his theory of knowledge, which 
does not allow Nan to know the laws, or natures, of things, and 
his theory of sanction,35 which Nakes all agencies of sanction 
extrinsic to fIIan, preclude the possibility of a concept of natural 
law. He presents a theory of justice as an artificial virtue at 
SONe length in Book III of the Treatise. 
HUAe looks upon sanction as one of ~ny Motives which influ-
ence Aen. It can not be denied that sanctions do influence fIIen. 
However, BUAe does not consider the essential question of the pur-
pose, beyond that of Plotivation, or the ecp ity of sanctions Pleted 




35See p. 48. 
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ter~ "sanction," his ~eaning is always ·sanction as Motivo." 
This restriction of the Aeaning of sanction to its influence 
on Nen fits in with the Manner in which HUMB uses sanction as a 
confirMatory proof for deter1'linisPl of the will. It is this proof 
which is principally to be criticized. Hul'lo is atteMpting to 
prove his ~enBral principle, that influencing Motives necessitate 
tbe will, by illustrating it frOM the COAl'lOn eAploYl'lent of sanc-
tions. Thereby, he hopes to justify his deterMinisM in the Moral 
and religious spheres. In the particular case of sanctions, which 
are acknowledged to influence the will, there is a constant con-
junction between l'lotives and actions. But this. he says, is a 
confir~ation of the general principle of the necessity between ~o­
tives and acti.ons. Therefore, the general principle is placed on 
a stronger footing. 
However, it is to be noted, that if there were necessity, as 
Rutile claill'ls, the.!!!!!. actions would always follow in the SMe cop!-
pI ete CirCIlt'1stances. In particular, si Milar sanctions would al-
ways effect siMilar actions. Tbis Hm'le asserts is the case. 
"These Mot i ves have a regular and uniforp! influence on the t'lind." 
But such a stateftent needs to be proven, not just asserted. As a 
Matter of fact, the evidence would seeM to indicate a general in-
effectiveness of sanction. Witness growing adult and juvenile de-
linquency, and perennially crowded prisons. Therefore, we Must 
conclude that BUPle's theory does not give a satisfactory explana-
tion of hut'lan experience. 
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On the other hand, the free will theory already eXplained 
does fit the facts of the case. The reward or pUniSnftlent for per-
forl'lling a certain action is one of !'lany AO Uves which are apt to 
influence the will. However, no one Aotive necessitates the will, 
and the will freely chooses the course of action it will follow. 
This explains our experience that sanctions cOMMonly do influence 
the will, but not in every case. 
Hu~e goes on to consider responsibility. lie begins frOA the 
fact that we censure or approve only personal actions of l'Ilen, that 
is, actions which arise frol'll the very character of Man and are not 
Merely casual and accidental. 36 But on the supposition of liberty 
of indifference, he says, there is no connection between a Man's 
character and bis actions. "According t'l the principle, there-
fore, which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a Man is as 
pure and untainted after having co~~itted the !'Ilost horrid criAe as 
at the first AOAent of his birth. nor is his character anywise co~ 
cerned in his actions, si~ce they are not derived frOM it, and the 
wickedness of the one can never be used as proof of the depravity 
of the ot her. ,,37 Therefore, liberty of :lndifference is incoPipati ... 
ble with responsibility_ 
Only on the supposition of liberty of spontaneity can the pe~ 
son be justly censured or praised for his actions, for only then 
36See p. 43. 
37!Q, p. 101. 
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can we be sure that his actions are truly the Manifestations of 
his character. HUPle says that, "liberty, according to the defini ... 
tion above Plentioned, in which all illen agree [They dol), is also 
essential to Plorality, and ••• no hUPlan actions, where it is 
wanting, are susceptible of any Moral qualities, or can be objects 
either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects of 
our Ploral senti~ent as far only as they are indications of the in ... 
ternal character, passions, and affections; it is ifllpossible that 
they give rise to praise or bla~e, when they proceed not frOM 
these pri.nciples, but are derived altogether frOM external vio-
le nce. ,,38 Thus only where causal l1ecessi ty is in evidence between 
~otives and actions is the notion of responsibility verified. And 
as Plen universally acknowledge the concept of responsibility, they 
iPlp1icit1y acknowledge liberty of spontaneity only. 
The Plain force of this arguPlent is negative. It goes: since 
liberty of indifference can not explain responsibility, and since 
liberty of spontaneity co~ects the precise point in which liberty 
of indifference is in error, the latter Plust be true. Or. since 
liberty of indifference Means causeless act on, and since liberty 
of spontaneity e~pbasize5 a caused action, only the latter can be 
the true explanation of a responsibility which everyone acknowl-
edges to exi st. However, as already noted, it is siJ'lply false 
38 Ibid., p. 102. 
-
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to saw that true liberty of indifference Means causeless action. 39 
Further1'lore, }recisely in affiming a necessary causal connection 
between character and actions, liberty of spontaneity rel'loves all 
responsibility, since a MaD is not responsible for an action he is 
bound to perforct}. 
Responsibility is had only where the agent could have acted 
otherwise. Now in RuPle's syste1'1 of natural deterPlinisJ'l, no agent 
can act ot herwise Ulan the necessary laws of hts character and 
circuPlstances allow. On the other hand, a systelll which proposes 
true liberty of indifference allows an agent to have various ~o­
tives which Ray be chosen as l'leans to desired goals. Thus only in 
the latter is freedo1'l and rosponsibility possible. 
RUPle supposes that wherever there is a cause of action, based 
on SOMe !'lottve, there is always necessity. He aSSUMes deterI1inis1'l 
of the will which }recludes free choice aMong real alternatives. 
This is false. It is precisely the presence of various !'lotives 
and the possi bility of choice arqong various Pleans to a desired 
goal, which Makes freedoM and responsibility possible. 
HUJ:l1e bas further obscured the proh1e
'
tt by confusing tePlpera-
!!!!!.1 and cbaract er, 40 It is true tha. t a Flan is born with his t ePl-
peraJl'lent, and that his actions Manifest his teMperaMent. But 
character, or the 1ac1-; of it, nrows and is fIlolded by freely en-
39See p. 67. 
'OSee p. 41. 
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couraging or restraining teftperaAent. It is a Ratter of co~on 
experience that a Ran ~ay i"prove on his teMperaRent if he chooses 
to do so, and this results in bis true character, for which he is 
really responsible. Character is the result of free activity; it 
is not the cause of deterftined activity_ 
D. THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF EVIL 
BURe foresees a fourth objection to his deterRinis~ fro~ the 
goodness of the Creator. He draws a picture of the consequences 
of his systeR in the darkest colors. "This is an objection which 
HURe urges against hiftself with a vivacity and force that deserves 
the best thanks of his opponents. n41 In proposing the objection 
and indicating what he thinks of it, BURe hopes to locate his 
philosophy where he thinks it belongs. In fact, be bopes to re-
strict all philosophy "to her true and proper province, the exaRi-
nation of co~on 1ife.·42 As a Ratter of fact in the end he vir-
tually adRi1s that he is unable to rp.conci1e his systet'l with God's 
goodness, but "the failure does not worry hiN very ftuch. n43 
DURa puts the objection as follows. He says that 
if voluntary actions be subjected to the s~e laws of neces-
sity with the operations of Ratter, there is a continued 
41Rickaby, p. 160. 
42EU, p. 107. 
-
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chain of necessary causes, preordained and predeterftined, 
reaching fro~ the original cause of all, to every 8ingle vo-
lition of every hu~an creature. 10 contingency anywhere in 
the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While in act, we 
are at the sa~e tiAe, acted upon. The ultiAate Author or all 
our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed 
~otion on this i~Aense Aachine, and placed all beings in that 
particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an in-
evitable necessity, Rust result. HUMan actions, therefore, 
either can have no ftoral turpitude at all, as proceeding fro" 
80 good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they Aust in-
volve our Creator in the saAe guilt, while he is acknowledged 
to be their ul tb!ate . cause and. author .44 
Nor should one assu~e tbat here HUAe is Aerely urging a truAped up 
objection against hb.self. He has said elsewhere tbat Plan t s char-
acter, and consequently his actions, are pre4eterftined by nature~5 
It is to be noted that this objection is correctly leveled at 
liberty of spontaneity and has no force against true liberty of 
indifference. The latter allows ~an free choice aNong various 
Means and therefore true responsibility. Therefore, ~an is re-
sponsible for sin in the world and not God. 
HUNe answers the first horn of his dile~a, that hUMan acti~ 
have no turpitude, by ~aintaining that regardless of speculative 
evidence to the contrary evil actions are indeed evil.. He uses 
two full pages of the Enguirl to do so.46 As to the second born, 
involve~ent of God in evil, he confesses little can be said. He 
44IDl, p. 103 .. 
45See p. 40. 




spends a short paragraph saying it.47 It "admits of not so easy 
and sati.sfactory an answer, nor is it possible to explain dis-
tinctly bow the Deity can be the fAAediate cause of all the ac-
tions of Men, without being the author of sin and Noral turpitude. 
These are Plysteries which Mere natural and unassisted reason is 
very unfit to handle.·48 One cOPlmentator rel'l8rks the following_ 
"He concluded that this is a 'Aystery' whicb reason cannot fatboM 
(for wbich, read, in accordance with the canons of HUPlean exege-
sis, that we Plust indeed iPlpute ain to God.)"49 
Our criticisPl of HUAe's stand will be that of Fr. Rickaby_ 
"There is a certain vulpine hUPlility in all this. But it had been 
Plore honest either to adNit the objection as valid and unanswera-
ble, an adPlission tantaftount to a denial of God--for a bad god is 
no god at all; or else to repudiate that HUMian doctrine frol'l 
which the whole objection proceeds, that tvo1untary actions be 
subjected to the saAe laws of necessity with the operations of 
Platter.' "50 In other words, }lulIIe placed U,e u1 tiPsate objection 
against his own systeM, was unable to answer it, but was likewise 
unwilling to Modify his systeR. 
47 BU, p. 106 
-
48 Ibid • 
-
49W. I. Matson, "On the Irrelevance of Free-will to Moral Re-
sponsibility, and the Vacuity of the Latter," ~, LXV (October 
1956), 493. 
50Rickaby, p. 161. 
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HUl'le's only atteMpt to Pleet this problem is a retreat into 
skepticisR. He pleads that the !'lind be restricted within the 
bounds set down for it in previous considerations. Over and above 
this adAonition, D. G. C. MacNabb notes, there is another atteApt-
ed solution in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Re1igion. 51 This 
co~~entator says the following of HUMe. "What he actually says 
elsewhere is that !'loral sentiNents have their origin in hUMan na-
ture and hu~an society. • • • God is not a hu~an being; there is, 
therefore, no ~ore sense in calling hi~ unjust or unkind than 
there is in calliny an alligator unjust or unkind. Experience 
affords no evidence that the Creator's sentiMents are at all siMi-
lar to ours •• 52 But thi s line of reasoning is just a ~ore verbose 
retreat into skepticist'l. For, it is also an ad.Mission 0 f the pos-
sibility of evil in God, and by eMphasiZing the liMitation of 
knowledge to "experience" it reiterates skepticis~ about "nonexpe-
rienced" things. 
Thus here in the final stage of our consideration of deter-
~inis~ of the will Hu~e hi~self directs us back to the beginnings 
of his philosophy, to his theory of knowledge. HUMe bas been con-
sistent in applying He Method of his approach, "Being an AtteI'lpt 
to introduce the experiI'lental Method of Reasoning into Moral Sub-
ed. 
5lDavid Hu~et BURe's DialoZues Concerning Natural Religion, 
Norl'lan XePlp SPlith t 2nd ed. Edinburgh, 1947), p. 198. 
52MacEabb, p. 203. 
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jects." The result is philosophical skepticisM, the denial of 
free will (which also involves a denial of Moral responsibility), 
and the iftputation of all evil to God. 
r 
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